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CAN CAPITAL TAX POLICY BE FAIR?
STIMULATING SAVINGS THROUGH
DIFFERENTIATED TAX RATES
Deborah M. Weisst
Americans do not save enough.' This proposition commands
rare assent among legislators and academics who agree on little
else. Economic growth requires investment, which in turn requires
savings. The American savings rate, never high, dropped precipitously during the 1980s, 2 and our present anemic savings rate endangers our future economic prosperity. The savings rate did not
decline from lack of attention. Policy analysts and editorialists warn
regularly of the consequences of inadequate savings. Their fears
are echoed on the floor of Congress: 3 The national savings rate is a
frequent subject of congressional hearings; 4 the Internal Revenue
Code contains a complex system of subsidies intended to encourage
t Associate professor of law, Stanford University. I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Joe
Bankman, Richard Craswell, Joe Grundfest, Henry Hu, Mark Kelman, Dan Kessler, Ed
McCafferfy, Mitch Polinsky, Bill Simon, Michael Wald, Alvin Warren, and Jim Whitman
for comments on previous drafts. Adam Frankel and Giselle Seved provided excellent
research assistance.
1 This statement has been articulated since the late 1970s. Joan Courtless, Trends
in Savings, 4 FAMILY ECON. REV. 15 (Dec. 1991) (arguing that Americans save considerably less than Western Europeans and Japanese, and their savings rate has declined significantly since 1970. U.S. personal savings rates: 1970-74, 8.5%; 1975-79, 7.5%; 198084, 6.6%; 1985, 5.1%); Martin Feldstein, Does the United States Save Too Little?, 67 AM.
ECON. ASS'N 116 (concluding that the United States would benefit if Americans would
save more); Burton Malkiel, The CapitalFormationProblem in the United States, 34J. OF FIN.
291 (May 1979) (stating that in the late 1970s, fear of continued inflation, increased
business regulation, weak capital structures, and increased risk premiums together led
to insufficient investment and savings in the United States).
2 In 1980, the personal savings rate was 7.9% of personal income; in 1991 it was
5.3%. See Economic Report of the President, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1334 (Feb. 1992).
3 See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. S229-32 (1979) (statement of Sen. McClure) (introducing a bill designed to stimulate waning U.S. savings); 125 CONG. REC. S5,068-69 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Pressler) (endorsing tax incentives to increase savings); 125 CONG.
REC. S18,119 (1979) (statement of Rep. Crane) (expressing need for increased personal
savings in the U.S.); 126 CONG. REC. S1,270-71 (1980) (statement of Sen. Roth) (identifying increased savings as critical to economic growth); 126 CONG. REc. H1,323-24
(1980) (statement of Rep. Brown) (identifying savings as essential for economic growth);
136 CONG. REC. S781-83 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Murkowski) (advocating reforms focused at increasing the U.S. personal savings rate); 138 CONG. REC.
E2220-22 (daily ed. July 22, 1992) (statement of Reps. Schulze &Jenkins) (introducing a
bill designed to assist with and stimulate U.S. savings).
4 See, e.g., Savings Incentives: Hearing Before Subcommittee on Savings, Pensions, and Investment Policy of the Senate Committee on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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Americans to save; and new proposals to stimulate savings are constantly offered.
But consensus that our savings rate is a problem has produced
no consensus about a solution. On the contrary, the savings rate
crisis has created a major political conflict. Legislators and academics argue over the merits of two different approaches to increasing
the savings rate: cuts in the tax rate on capital gains and deductions
for various special retirement savings vehicles. 5 Former President
Bush, for example, frequently advocated capital gains cuts, invariably meeting with vehement resistance from many Democrats. 6 The
two sides differ, above all else, in the degree of concern each expresses over the distributional effects of various schemes. Those
whose primary goal is to stimulate savings favor lower capital gains
rates for the unrealized appreciation on capital assets. 7 Opponents
of capital gains rates argue that affluent taxpayers, who save proportionally more, would receive a disproportionate amount of the benefits from these special rates. 8
To ensure that the benefits of tax cuts are fairly distributed,
some capital gain opponents propose providing deductions for contributions to various specially designed savings accounts. These
proposed accounts resemble the Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) now available in limited form. 9 However, the use of a deduction would exacerbate the distributive problems inherent in any savings subsidy because a deduction provides a larger subsidy to highbracket taxpayers. To offset this problem, the proposed accounts
would be subject to ceilings on the amount that could be deducted.
Other opponents of capital gains would retain the current system of
subsidies to employer pensions, especially nonelective ones, primarily because they believe that the nondiscrimination rules governing
5 Capital gains cuts and retirement savings subsidies are essentially the only general capital tax cuts under consideration. Other capital incentives in the Code or under
consideration would target specific classes of capital, such as investment tax credits or
accelerated cost recovery (ACRS) for tangible capital. This Article focuses on general
capital incentives, although many of its arguments also apply to more specific subsidies.
6
See, e.g., Ian K. Louden, Bush Challenges Democrats on CapitalGains, 53 TAx NOTES
772 (1991).
7
See, e.g., Catherine Hubbard, CapitalGains a Key Element of New Bush Budget, 53 TAx
NOTES 1096 (1991); Rep. Newt Gingrich, Capital-GainsCut is Vital, USA TODAY, Dec. 3,
1991, at 12A; Jude Wanniski, Blame Bush for the Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at
A25.
8
Tim Gray, Give Us that New-Time Religion: The 'Super IRA', 51 TAx NOTES 806, 806
(1991) (stating that debates in Senate Finance Committee deal with question of whether
affluent tax-payers save more); Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1989, at A34; Editorial,
N.Y. TiMES, May 15, 1986, at A26; This Capital Gains Tax Is No Economic Solution, USA
TODAY, Dec. 3, 1991, at 12A.
9 Gray, supra note 8, at 806. Tax Reform Is Worth Your IRA, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1986, at A26 (arguing that the biggest beneficiaries of IRAs are the wealthy because they
have more to save).
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such plans guarantee an equitable distribution of the savings
subsidy.
In this Article, I argue that neither IRAs in their current form,
nor employer pensions, nor a capital gains cut, can provide a fair or
cost-effective stimulus to savings. Instead, a system of differential
tax rates on labor and capital would be superior to any proposal
currently under consideration. This two-rate system could have two
primary advantages. First, it could impose not only a different rate,
but a different degree of progressivity, on labor and capital. Second, it could encourage savings in a distributionally fair way by cutting capital tax rates more dramatically for the less affluent than for
the more affluent.
A system of differentiated rates, though, may not entirely satisfy
the advocates of IRAs and pensions, since IRAs and pensions advance paternalistic as well as distributive goals. To address paternalistic concerns, I suggest instituting a differential-rate IRA. Bills
providing for differential rates on capital and labor have occasionally been introduced in Congress, but have met with surprisingly
little interest. Part I examines how ability-to-pay theory, long used
in tax policy analysis, creates a presumption that a single rate of tax
be imposed on both labor and capital. This presumption tends to
limit proposals for savings incentives to either capital gains cuts or
restricted deductions like IRAs and pensions. The ability-to-pay approach, I suggest, is less satisfactory than its principal alternative,
welfare economics, both as an analysis of fairness and as a guide to
determining efficiency. Unlike ability-to-pay theory, welfare economics suggests that a fair and efficient tax system may impose different rates on labor and capital.
Part II examines IRAs. In particular, it proposes a modified
version of IRAs that can accommodate paternalistic concerns while
making use of differentiated rates. IRAs, once universally available,
are presently permitted only to a few taxpayers. However, they have
great political appeal, and frequent attempts are made to reintroduce them on a broad scale. Unfortunately, IRAs depend on the use
of a deduction with all its associated distributive problems. Consequently, all past and pending IRA legislation has imposed strict ceilings on contributions. From an economic point of view, IRAs that
consist of deductions with ceilings are greatly inferior to a system of
differentiated rates. Yet the economic case for differentiated rates
may not satisfy those who support IRAs-at least for some taxpayers-subject to the imposition of ceilings. Economic theory assumes that individuals save rationally for their retirement, and if this
assumption is accepted, differentiated rates solve the distributive
problems of deductions. But economists may misread Congres-
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sional concern for the less affluent when they interpret this concern
as wholly distributive. Congress worries about the distributive effects of savings policy, but it also seems to believe that the middle
class and the poor are in need of greater paternalistic solicitude than
the well-to-do. Even these paternalistic concerns, though, can be
better met by differentiated rates than by conventional IRAs. The
paternalist's rate structure will differ from the economist's to the
extent that a paternalist would advocate more steeply progressive
rates to correct for the greater likelihood that the less affluent will
fail to save optimally. This rate structure can be reinforced by designing differential-rate IRAs that employ various strategies to restrict liquidity and encourage contributions.
Part III examines the system of employer pensions, currently
the largest retirement savings program. Employer pensions, like
IRAs, are subsidized through deductions. Congress has attempted
to remedy the distributive consequences of deductions by using the
so-called nondiscrimination rules. From an economic perspective,
though, I suggest that the present system of employer pensions and
nondiscrimination rules makes little sense and is far inferior to a
system of differentiated rates. However, employers are likely to resist the substitution of differential-rate IRAs for the present system
of employer pensions. One possible political compromise would retain the use of employer pensions, but replace the current deductions, subject to nondiscrimination rules, with a system of
differential rates.
Part IV explores the preferential rate for capital gains and argues that it is vastly inferior to a system of differentiated rates as a
means of encouraging savings. I suggest that the persistent appeal
of the capital gains rate as a reform measure results only from the
authority of its use in previous years, which gives it an advantage
over untried differential rates in defeating the presumption of uniform taxes.
I
Two

APPROACHES TO CAPITAL TAXATION

The current Internal Revenue Code imposes, in general, a uniform nominal rate of tax on income from various sources.1 0 In this
respect, the Code accords with the ability-to-pay approach to analyzing tax problems. This theory frames the basic issue in tax policy as
whether a given item should be included in the tax base. In so doing, the ability-to-pay theory forecloses the possibility of imposing a
10 I.R.G. §§ 61, 63 (1968). A minor exception existed between 1969 and the early
1980s, when capital and wage income were generally subject to a single rate schedule
but a higher top rate applied only to capital income.
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systematically different rate on different types of income. As a result, legislators seeking to subsidize savings by varying the effective
rate of tax on capital have two avenues open to them. They may
propose excluding capital from taxation through a deduction, yielding an effective capital tax rate of zero.1 1 Alternatively, they may
advocate capital gains rates, a device which, though seldom defended by ability-to-pay theorists, at least has the authority of history on its side.
This Part explains the origins of the presumption of the uniform tax in ability-to-pay theory. It then suggests welfare economics
as an alternative and preferable theory that allows for the possibility
of differential rates.
A.

Ability-To-Pay Theory and The Uniform Tax on Capital
and Labor

Since its inception, the American income tax has been levied at
a single rate on both capital and labor income. The present tax system is as much the product of practical politics as of academic theory. Still, in the patchwork of the Code there is an underlying
presumption of uniformity in the taxation of income from various
sources. That presumption generally reflects the perspective of the
most popular approach to tax equity, ability-to-pay theory.
Ability-to-pay theory has many of the same roots as its principal
alternative, welfare economics. Both ability-to-pay theory and welfare economics regard the basic goal of tax policy as the balancing
of fairness to individuals against social and administrative costs and
benefits. But only ability-to-pay theorists, not welfare economists,
proceed by asking whether the goals of equity and efficiency would
be served by the inclusion of various items in the tax base. This
method produces a tendency to think in terms of deductions and
exclusions rather than credits and special rates.12 This tendency has
its roots in the ability-to-pay approach to fairness and efficiency.

11
Capital subsidies that specifically target certain kinds of capital, such as ACRS or
the exemption for state and local bonds, also make use of deductions. The two general
capital subsidies that are implemented through a deduction are IRAs and pensions.
12 This approach is implicit in virtually every major piece of scholarship on the personal tax. See William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 309 (1972); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why they Fit Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World, 31
STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979); Alvin C. Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be FairerThan an
Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
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1. Equity
Ability-to-pay theory and economics differ in their starting
points. While economics begins with a descriptive theory of behavior, ability to pay theory begins with a concept of fairness. This concept of fairness requires that the tax burden be apportioned
according to the ability of individuals to pay. 13 Stated in this general form, the ability-to-pay principle may seem so obvious as to require no defense. However, the theory has been interpreted to
imply two specific principles that are more controversial than the
general form. First, similar burdens must be imposed on taxpayers
in similar positions-horizontal equity. Second, higher burdens
must be imposed on taxpayers in better positions-vertical equity. 14
On closer inspection, these principles contain a fairly controversial
position on a key question of equity. Both horizontal and vertical
equity assume that the relative pre-tax distribution of income is fair.
In other words, tax equity principles assume that the tax system
should preserve the relative ordering of incomes. 15 Both principles,
though, leave open the possibility that the absolute distribution may
16
be in need of some compression through progressive rates.
If all income came from a single source and was put to a single
use, then the only issue in tax would be deciding the proper degree
of progressivity. In fact, income has many sources and many uses.
Consequently, tax policy must address the question of what the
proper tax base should be. Since no one disputes that the tax base
should include labor income, the most important issue in this determination is whether the tax base should include capital income.
Most ability-to-pay theorists believe that both vertical and horizontal tax equity would be served by taxing the most comprehensive tax
base possible. 17 The most accepted comprehensive base is HaigSimons income, which consists of the individual's consumption plus
13
See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of An Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44,
45-46 (1967).
14 Id. at 45.
15
Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 POL. Sci. Q. 220, 222
(1893); Warren, supra note 12, at 1097. For a criticism of this aspect of traditional tax
doctrine, see Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L

TAxJ. 139 (1989).
16 AnHONY B. ATKINSON &JoSEPH E. STIGLrTz, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 29

(1980). If the average rates are consistent with income, the tax system is proportional,
and if they fall, it is regressive.
Many ability-to-pay theorists determine the ideal degree of progressivity with reference to the principle of equal sacrifice. This principle requires that all individuals make
equal proportionate sacrifices of well-being. If the marginal value of money declines as
income rises, the equal sacrifice principal is generally thought to imply a progressive
rate structure; that is, taxpayers with higher incomes face higher average tax rates.
17
See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 TAXEs
672, 674, 682 (1963).
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the net accretion to his net worth.1 8 In general, a tax on consumption plus accretion turns out to be identical to a tax on wage income
plus capital income, 19 and a tax on the Haig-Simons income is generally referred to as an income tax.
The equity arguments for the Haig-Simons tax base rest on an
interpretation of the ability-to-pay concept. The Haig-Simons view
of ability-to-pay treats income as valuable in itself as a way of commanding resources. That income may serve as a means to some
more fundamental end, like happiness, is not critical. Haig-Simons
theorists thus view all income as evidence of ability to pay and include it in the tax base, regardless of whether that income is used to
purchase consumption. 2 0 Thus, capital income, like wage income,
should be included in the measurement of capacity. Excluding it
2
would violate principles of both vertical and horizontal equity. 1
The case for the Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax base
therefore provides an argument against any savings subsidy at all.
The Haig-Simons framework was for many years the only theoretical approach used by ability-to-pay analysts. In a highly influential 1974 article, William Andrews argued for rejecting the Haig-

18 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). See generally Bittker,
supra note 12, at 925.
19 See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1123-28 (1974). For some qualifications to this, see Alvin C. Warren, Fairnessanda Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931,
938-41 (1975).
20
This principle has other implications for the definition of the ideal tax base. For
example, the Haig-Simons approach assumes that income is the only factor that influences well-being. Sometimes the use of income rather than utility as a tax base is defended as part of a general rejection of utilitarianism. Simons seems to reject
utilitarianism on egalitarian grounds; Warren, on anti-egalitarian grounds. SIMONS,
supra note 18, at 12-15; Warren, supra note 12, at 1096-97. Another reason given for
rejecting utility as a base is the administrative infeasibility of other measures. SIMONS,
supra note 18, at 52-54; Warren, supra note 12, at 1096. However, an argument for importing utility considerations in a piecemeal fashion, for example, the medical deduction, can be found in Andrews, supra note 12, at 331-43. Although they reject utility as
an underlying concept, advocates of an income base sometimes seem to regard income
as an intermediate concept, not a fundamental one. Most feel that since total income
indicates the ease with which the individual provides for himself, "faculty" or ability to
earn is the true underlying issue. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 291-92 (2d ed. rev. 1908). The exclusion of unexercised ability is
defended partly on administrative grounds, although one scholar has suggested that the
taxing ability is undesirable on the grounds that doing so represents an objectionable
invasion of individual freedom. Kelman, supra note 12, at 835- 44; see also Warren, supra

note 12, at 1114; Alan Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 381-82
(1979) (citing administrative problems and restraints on freedom as reasons to eliminate
earning capacity from taxation).
21
See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 18, at 95-100; Warren, supra note 12, at 1090-92.
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Simons framework in favor of a consumption tax. 2 2 Andrews and
others since have suggested that a consumption tax would be more
horizontally equitable than even an ideal pure accretion tax. 28 In
adopting the principle of horizontal equity, this argument implicitly
endorsed certain aspects of the basic equity framework of comprehensive tax base analysis, notably the privileged status of the pretax
distribution of income. However, the horizontal equity analysis itself rests on strikingly different premises from those underlying the
case for a comprehensive income tax. The advocates of a consumption tax argue that capital taxes are horizontally inequitable because
two taxpayers with income of the same pre-tax net present value will
have incomes of different post-tax net present value if their incomes
are received at different times, or if they have different tastes for the
timing of consumption. 24 By focusing on consumption rather than
income, the argument for a consumption tax moves towards a utility
based conception of ability-to-pay, 2 5 and rejects the control-overresources approach implicit in comprehensive tax base analysis.
The horizontal equity argument for a consumption tax suggests
that capital income need not be taxed at the same rate as labor income. Yet it implies more than this about the proper tax treatment
of capital. Specifically, it suggests that capital should be wholly excluded from the tax base, for only in this way can the system preserve pretax relative positions. This implication supports the tax
system's use of deductions to subsidize savings.
Consumption tax proponents emphasize horizontal equity arguments, but they also defend their proposal as vertically equitable.
Consumption tax opponents, however, argue that excluding capital
from the tax base would impede attempts to attain vertical equity.
Since the more affluent save a higher proportion of their income,
excluding capital from the tax base would tend to favor them. Defenders of a consumption tax respond that, like an income tax, consumption taxes can be imposed at progressive rates.
Although this is undeniably true, income and consumption tax
proponents disagree about what constitutes comparable progressiv22
Andrews, supra note 19, at 1113. Although Andrews regarded the horizontal equity argument as subsidiary to his main point, it has received more attention in subsequent literature than the administrative argument.
23 Id. at 1165-77.
24
Irving Fisher first made this argument. IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPrAL
AND INcOME 249-53 (1906); see also Barbara H. Fried, Fairnessand the Consumption Tax, 44
STAN. L. REV. 961, 967-68 (1992); Warren, supra note 19, at 934-38. The most telling
objection to this argument is that all taxes discriminate against someone: Wage taxes
against workers, capital taxes against savers. Andrews, supra note 19, at 1169. For other
objections, see Gunn, supra note 20, at 382-86; Mark G Kelman, Time Preference and Tax
Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1983); Fried, supra; Warren, supra note 12, at 1094-1121.
25
See infra part B.
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ity, because the progressivity of an income tax is not straightforwardly comparable to that of a consumption tax. With a single rate
of tax on both capital and labor, the definition of progressivity is
simple. A tax system is progressive if marginal rates rise with income. For example, income up to $30,000 might be taxed at 10%,
and income over $30,000 might be taxed at a marginal rate of 20%.
But if capital is excluded from the tax base, should the concept of
progressivity be defined with respect to total income, or labor income only? A separate progressive tax on each source might fail to
be progressive with respect to income as a whole. For example, suppose that the progressive rate structure described above applies
only to labor income. An individual with $50,000 in labor income
would pay taxes of $30,000(.1) + $20,000(.2) = $7,000, for an effective rate of 14% on income. An individual with $30,000 in each
capital and labor income would pay ($30,000)(.1) + ($30,000)(0) =
$3,000, for an effective rate of 5% on all income. Still, the appearance of regressivity may be illusory. If fairness dictates that capital
be wholly excluded from the tax base, a definition of progressivity
26
based on income makes little sense.
Consumption tax theory and comprehensive income tax theory,
then, have an important common feature: in both, the decision
whether to tax capital is equivalent to a determination of the proper
tax base. Thus, only two tax rates on capital are possible: the same
rate as on wages, if capital is included in the tax base, or a rate of
zero, if it is not. If, as comprehensive tax base theory suggests, capital income should be included in the tax base, it should be wholly
subject to taxation; if, as consumption tax proponents argue, capital
does not belong in the tax base, all capital income should be exempt
from taxation.
2. Efficiency Arguments
Ability-to-pay theorists regard equity analysis as fundamental,
but advocates of a consumption tax and of a comprehensive tax base
both rely on efficiency as well as equity arguments. Yet, like the
ability-to-pay arguments from equity principles, these efficiency arguments lead to the conclusion that capital should be either wholly
taxed or wholly excluded from the tax base.
Andrews and other advocates of the consumption tax have argued that the complete exclusion of capital would be efficient. They
have suggested that the efficiency advantages of a consumption tax
would be primarily administrative. Most of the truly intractable difficulties in the Code, Andrews argued, were the result of the impos26

Cf. NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 23 (1955).
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sibility of implementing a true accretion tax on capital.
Consequently, the taxation of capital is inherently arbitrary and capricious, and exempting capital entirely would be less distortionary,
more administratively efficient, and more fair. 2 7 This line of reasoning implies that capital should be wholly excluded from the tax base.
A lower tax rate would leave intact all the administrative problems
associated with the tax.
On the other hand, comprehensive income tax base proponents
believe that efficiency requires the full taxation of capital income.
One efficiency argument for full taxation is substantive: markets
work well without interference, and the most efficient tax would interfere least with market efficiency by treating all transactions uniformly. A comprehensive income base, with few exclusions or
28
deductions, achieves this uniformity.
Not all comprehensive tax base theorists accept the substantive
efficiency argument. The more popular efficiency arguments for a
comprehensive base have been procedural. These comprehensive
tax theorists argue that market interference, when necessary, should
be accomplished through direct expenditures rather than through
so-called tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are adjustments to
gross income that are defended on grounds unrelated to tax policy.
These tax adjustments are, in effect, subsidies that could be implemented by direct expenditures, but are instead enacted through the
tax code. 29 Comprehensive tax base proponents argue that use of
the tax system has at least two important faults. 30 First, it often results in a haphazard pattern of implementation quite different from
what would have resulted under a system of direct expenditures.
Second, use of the tax system hides expenditures from political
scrutiny because such expenditures are protected from the procedural rules governing the normal budgetary process.
Perhaps the most important example of haphazardness is the
implementation of most tax expenditures, including the system of
retirement incentives, through deductions. Comprehensive tax theorists are correct in thinking that using a deduction for a tax expenditure produces a structure that is undesirably different from what
27

Andrews, supra note 19, at 1123-65.

28

See, e.g., Blum, supra note 17, at 674. For an excellent and highly critical analysis

of this argument, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitationof
Tax Incentives, 64 TEx. L. REV. 973 (1986).
29
STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM vii (1973).
30 SURREY, supra note 29, at 174; Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Expenditures: How to Identify Them; How to Control Them, 15 TAx NoTEs 595 (1982); Stanley S.
Surrey, FederalIncome Tax Reform: The VariedApproaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures
with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 359-64 (1970). For a skeptical
view of the idea of tax expenditures, see Boris I. Bittker, Accountingfor Federal"Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAx J. 244 (1969).
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would have resulted from a pattern of direct expenditures. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that the value of a deduction increases with the tax bracket of the taxpayer, so that the use of
deductions produces a subsidy rate that increases with income.
Even if the total number of subsidies taken were the same across
income classes, this inverse relation between subsidy and income
would be inconsistent with principles of vertical equity. The inverted structure of the deduction subsidy seems even more unfortunate in the context of savings because, like most tax theorists,
Congress believes that high income taxpayers save proportionally
more than other taxpayers.
As we will see, the use of a deduction has given rise to a complex set of rules intended to undo the deduction's distributive effect.
This regressive subsidy could be avoided by use of a credit. Credits
differ in an important way from deductions. While the value of a
deduction depends on the tax bracket of the taxpayer, the value of a
credit may be the same for all taxpayers or may be designed to vary
according to criteria other than the recipient's tax bracket. Despite
this advantage, Congress has been slow to switch from deductions
to credits. Unfortunately, academic tax analysts have not exerted
much effort in encouraging them to do so. Although most opponents of tax expenditures concede that a properly designed tax expenditure, such as credit, could be an acceptable policy tool, they
are skeptical about whether political problems associated with tax
expenditures are actually surmountable. 3 '
Indeed, the problem of ill-designed subsidy measures may be
related to the problem of political expedience. Perhaps the use of
deductions as a subsidy mechanism is simply an unreflective transposition of tax base reasoning to tax expenditures. 3 2 Yet the use of
deductions may be an attempt to disguise tax expenditures from
political scrutiny. Comprehensive tax theorists regard many of
these provisions, especially the retirement savings deductions, as
obvious tax expenditures. 33 They are even listed as such in the tax
expenditure budget. But, as tax expenditure theorists are eager to
point out, legislators are simple folk who may be misled into thinking that a given deduction is justified by the definition of the tax

31
The procedural attack on tax expenditures has a certain paradoxical quality. As
in the case of deductions, the haphazardness of tax expenditures often results from the
desire to disguise the expenditure as a part of the definition of income. Stigmatizing tax
expenditures provides another motive for such efforts at disguise and inhibits the rational redesign of these deductions.
32 Surrey, supra note 30, at 720.
33 Id. at 711.

1993]

STIMULATING SAVINGS

217

base, rather than as a tax expenditure.3 4 Still, even a Congressman
can see that a tax credit is always a tax expenditure. Similarly, a
differential rate, such as that provided to capital gains, invariably
35
indicates a tax preference.
Many comprehensive tax base theorists thus dismiss the retirement savings provisions as inherently ill-advised tax expenditures.
A few tax policy theorists have allowed for the possibility that a tax
expenditure to encourage retirement savings might be justified.
However, they express doubt about whether vertical equity can be
achieved through these deductions.
With a comprehensive tax base framework, then, savings subsidies cannot be justified except as a tax expenditure. Partly because
of the campaign against them by comprehensive tax base theorists,
tax expenditures tend to be implemented through deductions. Recent developments in tax theory have provided a different argument
for exempting capital from taxation, but have not changed the basic
analytic framework of the comprehensive tax base. Indeed, these
developments provide an even stronger argument for the use of a
deduction.
B.

The Welfare Economics Approach to Capital Taxation

The ability-to-pay theory of tax policy arises from a specific conception of fairness: taxation according to one's ability to pay. This
leads naturally to tax policy that proceeds by asking whether various
items should be included or excluded from the measurement of taxable capacity. Even when modified to incorporate certain efficiency
considerations, this approach lacks a central ingredient of a complete analysis of efficiency: namely, a theory of how people respond
to incentives.
Such a theory of individual behavior is provided by economics.
The ability-to-pay approach was developed by economists, but did
not fully integrate the insights of descriptive economics. Descriptive

economics suggests that restricted deductions chosen by Congress
to advance its distributional aims are a poor policy tool. From an

economic perspective, a system of differentiated taxes on capital and
labor would accomplish Congressional goals more efficiently. How-

ever, such a system is hard to reconcile with ability-to-pay views of
fairness. But economic theory has, in recent years, suggested a different and more persuasive approach to equity. From the viewpoint
of economic theory, differential taxes may be fair as well as efficient.
34
SURREY, supra note 29, at 98 (credits "lack the protective coloration possessed by
those tax expenditures using the exclusion or, perhaps more so, the deduction device.").
35 Id. at 100.
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The Economic Approach to Behavior

The economic analysis of individual behavior assumes that individuals choose rationally among the available consumption items to
maximize the utility they derive from their consumption, as limited
by their income. If the individual behaves rationally, the consumption choices he makes will maximize his well-being. This analysis of
individual behavior applies to savings in that consumption in one
period is a different good from consumption in another. For present purposes, an individual's life may be thought to consist of two
periods, his working-life period and his retirement period. An individual's decision to save is thus a decision to allocate consumption
between two periods. This is analogous to a decision to allocate
consumption within a single period between goods such as food and
housing. The rate at which the individual discounts future consumption is called his rate of time preference. Similarly, the individual's decision to supply labor results from a decision to allocate time
between leisure and the consumption goods that wages buy.
The economic approach to the taxation of capital proceeds
along entirely different lines from the approach used by ability-topay theorists. Ability-to-pay analysis begins by asking what belongs
in the tax base or how taxable income should be defined. The tax
base is determined by comparisons between the efficiency and equity of various tax treatments of individuals with different incomes.
In contrast, economic analysis places no significance on the definition of taxable income. Consequendy, unlike the ability-to-pay approach, the economic approach does not assume that capital must
be taxed at the same rate as wage income or not at all. Instead, both
capital income and wage income may be taxed at any rates the government chooses.
The economic model of individual behavior can be used to analyze the fairness and efficiency losses from various tax systems. In
practice, economists and others who use the rational choice approach have tended to emphasize efficiency concerns over concerns
about retirement security or distribution,3 6 partly because the economic analysis of equity is less developed than the analysis of efficiency. Still, economic analysis can suggest some approaches to
36 Gray, supra note 8, at 806 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's
response to a question about whether middle class taxpayers would use IRAs: "I
wouldn't be overly concerned about where the savings occur[s] because what we're trying to do is raise savings and to build capital investment and create jobs for everyone in
the economy."); see also Bennett Minton, Congress Postpones Consideration of Big-Ticket
"Growth Package", 53 TAx NoTEs 999 (1991) (testimony ofJack Kemp, Secretary, Dep't
of Housing and Urban Development).
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problems of equity that may be more satisfactory than the ability-topay approach.
2.

Efficiency

The word "efficiency," in its strictest sense, means Pareto-efficiency. A policy is Pareto-efficient if no change can make someone
better off without making someone else worse off. Policy A is
Pareto-superior to policy B if A makes someone better off without
making anyone else worse off. However, Pareto-efficiency does not
preclude some very inequitable distributions, such as one person
owning everything. In order to examine Pareto-efficiency, I will
evade the problem of distributive fairness by assuming that all individuals have identical tastes and endowments, so that any tax policy
will affect all equally. Both wage taxes and interest taxes will have
adverse efficiency effects by discouraging the productive activities
on which they are imposed, work and savings. The size of these
losses will depend on the responsiveness, or elasticity, of labor and
capital to ttxes. The higher the elasticity, the greater the loss.
Diagrams 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate some hypothetical markets for
factors like labor or capital. Both diagrams show the same factor
demand, labeled D. The lines labeled S (no tax) represent the supply of a given factor in the absence of taxes. This line is flatter in
Diagram 1(a), representing a higher degree of elasticity. The lines
labeled S (tax) indicate the supply curve under a tax needed to produce a given amount of revenue. That revenue is indicated by the
striped box, which is by construction the same size in both diagrams. The dotted area represents the deadweight loss triangle, or
the efficiency loss resulting from the tax. This area is larger in Diagram l(a) because supply is more elastic.
The tax in Diagram 1 (b), on the less elastically supplied factor,
is clearly more efficient. However, even for such inelastically supplied factors, the deadweight loss rises proportionally faster than
the tax rates. Thus, the efficient tax structure will combine a relatively high tax on the less elastically supplied factor with a relatively
low tax on the more elastically supplied factor. 3 7 Consequently, the
37

A complete account of the optimal tax system considers the full range of possible

taxes that the government may levy. These include lump-sum taxes and indirect or com-

modity taxes. Since a lump-sum tax does not depend on the level of any particular activity, it does not distort any behavior. In the absence of distributive concerns, the
nondistortionary properties of a lump-sum tax make it ideal. However, distributive concerns make lump-sum taxes impracticable. Some individuals have a higher earnings capacity than others, and most agree that these individuals should be taxed at higher rates.
This earnings capacity cannot be directly observed and thus lump-sum taxes cannot be
practically made progressive. Ruling out lump-sum taxes is equivalent to stipulating

that the consumption of leisure cannot be taxed. With these assumptions, a system of
uniform taxes is not desirable. Rather, in a short term context, a system of differential
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efficient share of taxes that capital and labor should bear will be an
empirical question.
But there are special theoretical reasons why capital taxes may
be less desirable than labor taxes. The previous analysis rests on
the standard assumptions of economics. These assumptions imply
that self-interested individual decisions in a competitive market will
lead to socially ideal results without government intervention. This
principle holds in many circumstances for labor markets.
Savings, however, is an important exception to the rule that individual rationality leads to socially ideal results. Even without
taxes, savings may fall below the socially optimal point. This
shortage of savings results from a simple externality referred to as
the overlapping generations problem. Savings affects the welfare of
future generations, but those generations play no role in determining today's savings. This suggests that national savings may be too
low to protect the interests of future generations.3 8 Indeed, this
reasoning suggests that capital should not only be free from tax but
actively subsidized as well. Not only may savings be too low in principle but many economists have concluded that the U.S. savings rate
is in fact too low.3 9 Capital, then, should probably be taxed at lower
rates than labor.
The economic analysis so far assumes that although different
rates may be imposed on capital and labor, each factor is to be taxed
at a flat rate rather than through progressive or regressive rates.
The assumption of a flat rate may seem to be a natural corollary of
the assumption that all individuals are identical. Varying rate structures are usually thought to redistribute income between individuals
of different income levels. With identical individuals, though, a vataxes on different consumption goods would be optimal. This is shown in a simple partial equilibrium setting, like that given in the text accompanying this footnote, from ATKINSON & STIGLrrz, supra note 16, at 367-70. A comprehensive analysis is provided in
the classic F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). In
particular, an efficient tax system will produce proportionate movement along the compensated demand for all goods. Id.; ATKINSON & S-nGLrrz, supra note 16, at 373. This
point can be extended to savings through the analogy between consumption in different
periods and consumption of different goods in a single period. This point, made briefly
in the original Ramsey article, supra at 59, has been extensively developed regarding
savings in the public finance literature. See, e.g., Martin Browning & John Burbidge,
Consumption and Income Taxation, 42 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 281 (1990). See generally ATKINSON & STir=Tz, supra note 16, at 442-51.
38
See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond, National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 55 AM.
ECON. REV. 1126 (1965); Lars-Gunnar Svensson &Jbrgen W. Weibull, ConstrainedParetoOptimal Taxation of Labourand CapitalIncomes, 34 J. PUB. ECON. 355, 361 (1987). See generally ATKINSON & STIGLIrZ, supra note 16, at 442-51.
39
See, e.g., MichaelJ. Boskin, Theoretical and EmpiricalIssues in the Measurement, Evaluation, and Interpretation of Postwar U.S. Saving, in SAVINGS AND CAPrrAL FORMATION 11, 2327 (F. Gerard Adams & Susan M. Wachter eds., 1986).
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rying rate structure may serve the purpose of efficiency. This argument is illustrated in Diagram 2. Consider the situation of a single
individual, whose supply of savings is illustrated by the line labelled
S.

Irates
r +t*

S

S*
Savings

In the absence of taxes, the market rate of interest, r, would
determine the individual's savings, which is S. With a single rate
tax, t* (t* <0), the individual saves S*, which gives rise to a consumer surplus of area A +B and government revenues in the amount
of area C+D. A progressive rate schedule imposes lower tax rates
on initial units of savings and higher rates on later units. The progressive rates illustrated impose the same marginal tax t* at S* as
the flat rate, but with the progressive tax schedule, they cause taxpayer surplus to rise to area A+B-+C while they cause government
revenues to drop to area D. At the extreme, a progressive schedule
could impose rates of zero until reaching the marginal unit S*, at
which point a rate of t* would be imposed. As a result, consumers
would receive a surplus of area A +B-+C+D, and government revenues would be virtually eliminated.
The government could raise more revenue without increasing
distortionary marginal taxes by taxing marginal increments of savings at decreasing, regressive rates. The first units of savings give
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rise to the highest levels of consumer surplus, and therefore, can be
subjected to higher levels of taxation. Thus, it makes the most sense
to impose the largest taxes on the first dollars of savings.
A perfectly tailored schedule follows the supply curve, leaving
the market equilibrium unchanged while extracting all taxpayer surplus. This tax structure is analogous to the price discrimination
practiced by a monopolist. A purely price-discriminating schedule
would leave the market equilibrium of S unchanged, while yielding
government revenues of area A-+B+C+D+E.An imperfect pricediscriminating schedule, illustrated by the line labelled "regressive
rates," provides the marginal rate t* at S*, leaving the equilibrium as
S*. This results in a consumer surplus of area A and government
revenues of area B+C+D. An alternative schedule would provide
perfectly price-discriminating tax rates up until S*, but impose
higher rates above that point, leaving savings at S*, eliminating consumer surplus, and providing government revenues of area
A+B+C+D.
3.

Equity

If all individuals are identical, a system of differentiated regressive taxes for capital and labor will not only be efficient but also fair.
The preceding part assumed that all individuals are identical. Identical individuals benefit equally under efficiency gains and suffer
equally under efficiency losses. This assumption obviates the need
for explicit consideration of equity; under this assumption, efficient
schedules are equitable. The fact that the optimal schedule may be
regressive is unproblematic.
Where individuals are not identical a policy that benefits one
individual may hurt another. The analysis of equity is less developed than that of efficiency, and economists have reached no consensus about how to make trade-offs between the gains of one
person and the losses of another. 40 No distributive principle com40
The central obstacle in equity analysis is that most plausible equitable principles
require interpersonal comparisons of utility, which in turn require cardinal measurements of utility. Cardinal measurement is highly problematic and can be avoided by
using descriptive utility theory. Some economists argue that the the problem of cardinal
measurement is insuperable, and therefore economics has little to say about equity.
Among those economists willing to employ the cardinal utility measurement, two basic
approaches are utilized: (1) a version of the equal sacrifice principle framed in terms of
equal utility sacrifice and the social welfare function; (2) a mathematical implementation
of the utilitarian calculus, which calculates the maximization of total social well-being.
An analysis of optimal taxation asks which combination of taxes best balances distributional effects and efficiency effects in order to maximize social welfare. This approach
differs fundamentally from equal sacrifice theory in that no special emphasis is placed on
the pretax distribution of income, nor does it assume that the relative distribution of
income is fair.
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mands as much support among economists as horizontal and vertical equity do among ability-to-pay theorists. Still, the absence of an
accepted equity principle does not prevent welfare economists from
providing useful economic analysis. All possible economic theories
of equity suggest that taxes need not be uniform. The reason is simple: Pareto-efficiency is a precondition to all economic ideas of fairness, and Pareto-efficiency may require differential tax rates. To see
this, consider how the individual whose factor supplies are described by Diagram 1 would prefer to be taxed. This person would
be least burdened by a non-uniform tax, and would therefore prefer
such a tax, regardless of any differences between himself and other
taxpayers. Thus, regardless of that person's preferences, there
would be no reason to view uniform taxes as more fair.
4. Progressivity
The proper degree of rate progressivity in a theoretically satisfactory equity analysis would be a by-product of a general process
like maximizing a social welfare function. However, economists
have yet to produce a theoretically satisfactory account of equity. In
practice, equity analysis has proceeded informally, searching for a
degree of progressivity that feels appealing. This common sense
approach to equity is perfectly adequate to analyze individual differences in income as long as all individuals save the same proportions
of their incomes. To see how Congress could move from a system
of uniform rates on capital and labor to a system of differentiated
rates of the same degree of progressivity, consider the following example. Assume all income is taxed at a proportional rate of 20%.
There are two groups of workers with different incomes who both
receive 10% of their income from capital. Affluent workers earn
$50,000 a year and have $5,000 in income from capital; less affluent
workers earn $20,000 a year and have $2,000 in capital income. Affluent taxpayers pay total taxes of $55,000(.2) = $11,000, and less
affluent taxpayers pay total taxes of $22,000(.2)=$4,400. Both
groups have an effective tax rate of 20%.
Now suppose that Congress wishes to retain the proportionality
of the system as a whole while cutting capital taxes. Suppose that it
attempts to do this by cutting capital taxes to 10% while maintaining leaving wage taxes at 20%. If, as assumed, all income classes
save the same fraction of their income, the proportionality of the tax
system is preserved. Affluent individuals pay ($50,000)(.2)+
($5,000)(.1)=$10,500, for an effective rate of 19%. Less affluent
individuals would pay ($20,000)(.2)+($2,000)(.1)=$4,200, for an
identical effective rate of 19%.
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Although this common-sense approach to fairness has much to
recommend it, this approach becomes complicated if different income classes save at different rates. If all individuals, rich and poor,
save the same proportion of their income, then uniform reductions
in capital taxes will not affect the progressivity of the system as a
whole. The congressional assumption that the rich save more is
shared by many economists 41 and social thinkers, 4 2 and has empirical support from both economists43 and psychologists. 4 4 The studies do not provide conclusive evidence of the most controversial
41
The belief that savings increases more than proportionately with income was expressed by many neoclassical capital theorists. See, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF
INTEREST 72-73 (1930); EUGEN V. BOHM-BAWERK, THE PosrrIVE THEORY OF CAPrrIAL 27576, 314 (William Smart trans., 1891). Later neoclassicals were apt to make assumptions
about utility functions that eliminated any association between savings and income.
There are, however, a few who have explored the relation between the two. Shlomo
Maital & Sharona Maital, Time Preference, Delay of Gratification, and the Intergenerational
Transmission of Economic Inequality: A Behavioral Theory of Income Distribution, in ESSAYS IN
LABOR MARxT ANALYSIs 179 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1977); Luigi L. Pasinetti, Rate of Profitand Income Distributionin Relation to the Rate of Economic Growth,
29 REV. EcoN. STUD. 267 (1962).
42 Many social theorists have argued that the tendency to save more is simply one
corollary of the theory that an individual's future-orientedness increases with class. See,
e.g., EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY REVISrrED 52-76 (1974).
43 Studies by economists uniformly confirm that time preference is lower among
higher income individuals. The most comprehensive study, using household consumption data, found-depending on the exact assumptions employed-that discount rates
for the poorest 5%o of families were between 3.5% and 5% higher than for the wealthiest
5%. Emily C. Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidencefrom PanelData, 99
J. POL. ECON. 54, 66-69 (1991). A few other computation methods produced even larger
discrepancies, but were not statistically significant. Similar results have been obtained in
studies of appliance purchases, Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the
Purchase and Utilizationof Energy-Using Durables, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 33 (1979), as well as in
studies using survey evidence, M. Kurz et al., The ExperimentalHorizon and the Rate of Time
Preferencefor the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments: A Preliminary Study, Research Memorandum 21, Center for the Study of Welfare Policy, Stanford Research Institute (November 1973); J. Paul Leigh, Accounting for Tastes: Correlates of Risk and Time
Preferences, 9J. POsT-KEYNESIAN ECON. 17 (1986).
44 A large body of literature by experimental psychologists supports the view that
the willingness to delay gratification is correlated with income. Most of these studies
provided laboratory subjects with the choice between an earlier, smaller reward and a
later, larger reward. However, these psychological studies do not clearly confirm the
theories that explain greater delay through class factors. Many sociologists and political
thinkers have suggested that the tendency among the more affluent to delay gratification
is connected to a longer time horizon. See, e.g., BANFIELD, supra note 42, at 52-76. Several laboratory studies confirm the view that the length of an individual's subjective time
horizon is positively related to class. Lawrence L. LeShan, Time Orientation and Social
Class, 47J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 589 (1952); Angela O'Rand & Robert Ellis, Social
Class and Social Time Perspective, 53 Soc. FORCES 53 (1974). However, it appears that the
ability to delay gratification is related to the accuracy of the individual's time perception
and not to the length of his time horizon. Walter Mischel & Ralph Metzner, PreferenceFor
Delayed Reward as a Function of Age, Intelligence, and Length of Delay Interval, 64 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 425 (1962). One study found, somewhat ambiguously, that while accuracy of time perception was more important than length of time horizon, preoccupation
with future events might be predictive of the tendency to delay. Stephen L. Klineberg,
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aspect of the relationship between income class and time preference: Do differences in time preferences result from fundamentally
different tastes or are they simply manifestations of a given taste
45
structure at different income levels?
The possibility that different income classes save at different
rates introduces some complications into the design of the rate
structure. A tax that was progressive, proportional, or regressive
with respect to each income source separately might have a different
distributive effect on income as a whole. Suppose that total income
were subject to this proportional rate structure, but income classes
were to differ in their propensities to save. Under this scenario, preserving a given degree of progressivity with respect to income requires steeper cuts on capital taxes for less affluent workers. For
example, suppose that less affluent workers now earn $20,000 a year
and still have $2,000 in capital income and affluent workers still earn
$40,000 a year but have $15,000, not $5,000, in capital income.
The income of the two groups is the same as in the previous example, but the income of the affluent now contains proportionately
more capital income when compared with the less affluent workers.
If capital taxes are, as in the previous example, cut to 10% for everyone, affluent taxpayers pay $40,000(.2) + $15, 000(.1) = $9,500 in
taxes, for an effective tax rate of 17%. Less affluent taxpayers pay,
as before, ($20,000).2 + ($2,000).1 = $4,200, again for an effective
rate of 19%. In this example, the capital tax cut has made the tax
system regressive with respect to income, even though the tax rate
on each factor taken separately is proportional. Yet the tax system
cannot obviously be called regressive since, in the economic framework, income is not self-evidently the proper basis for welfare comparisons. In any utility based approach, comparisons based on
income will, at best, approximate the proper comparison based on
utility. For example, two people with equal endowments of energy
and ability may have the same utility levels but different money inFuture Time Perspective and the Preferencefor Delayed Reward, 8 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 253 (1968).
45 Differences in savings behavior might result from two distinct causes. First, all
individuals might have basically identical utility functions and attitudes towards savings,
but those attitudes might uniformly depend on income level. Alternatively, rich people
and poor people might have fundamentally different tastes, causing each group to behave differently even if sudden fate were to reverse their fortunes. Although these taste
differences might not respond to short term income shifts, they also might reflect longterm, intergenerational differences in income distribution. Some observers acknowledge the role of time preference as both a cause and effect of income differences.
BANFIELD, supra note 42, at 55-57; BOHM-BAWERK, supra note 41, at 275, 314; FISHER,
supra note 41, at 333-38. Some emphasize the role of time preference as a cause, JOHN
RAE, THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL 218-36 (Charles W. Mixter ed., 1905);
Maital & Maital, supra note 41, at 179. Others have interpreted differences in time preference as an effect. ELLIOT LIEBow, TALLY'S CORNER 223 (1967).
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comes. The difference in income results from different tastes: one
may prefer leisure goods while the other may prefer consumption
goods. Thus, at best, an income-based definition of progressivity is
46
a proxy for a utility-based system.
The preceding example reveals that the income-based definition of progressivity has serious limitations. Nevertheless the argu47
ment for income progressivity has a powerful emotional appeal.
Without a theoretically satisfactory analysis of equity, popular sentiment deserves considerable weight. I will assume that progressivity
is properly measured with respect to income as a whole.
It would seem, then, that an ideal system would have a separate
schedule of rates for capital and labor, imposing more steeply progressive rates on capital. 48 This system would, however, have one
important disadvantage: high-income taxpayers as well as low-income ones would receive the benefits of the low marginal rates on
the first few units of savings. As illustrated in Diagram 2, this consequence of progressive rates reverses the efficient rate structure,
which is regressive. The inefficiency of low taxes on inframarginal
savings suggests that a single rate structure on capital income may
not be the ideal policy choice.
An alternative to a single progressive structure for capital income would provide rates on capital income that varied with the
level of wage income. The simplest means of achieving this alternative would impose a flat rate on capital income based on wage in46
See, e.g., Richard Goode, The Superiority of the Income Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE
TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDrrURE? 49-52 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980). Comparisons

based on utility become exceedingly difficult to make when diverse tastes are involved.
See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77. See generally
ATKINSON & STiGLrrz, supra note 16, at 261.
47
Warren, supra note 12, at 1090-93.
48 One issue that arises in a system of differentiated rates is the treatment of human
capital. This is a problem in diverse situations, such as the deductibility of education
expenses, tax liability compensation awards, and so on. The policy issues raised by
human capital are distinct from those raised by other savings. One possibility is that
human capital income should be subject to a regime entirely separate from other capital
income. The present system treats human capital income neither consistently as capital
income nor consistently as wage income. See generally Paul B. Stephan III, FederalIncome
Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REv. 1357 (1984). The adoption of differentiated
rates, however, would cause at least one new problem. Under the present tax code,
when a corporation makes a payment to a shareholder/employee the characterization of
the payment determines its taxability. If the payment is characterized as a dividend, it is
taxable at the corporate and individual levels; however, if it constitutes a wage payment,
the corporation may deduct it. Under a system of differentiated rates, distinguishing
between wage and capital payments is also a problem for entities not subject to a double
tax, such as S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. This problem also
arises when a yield-exemption consumption tax is used. A cash flow consumption tax
only partly avoids the problem, because it places additional significance on the already
difficult task of labeling certain expenditures, such as education expenses, as consumption or human capital investments.
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come. For example, with a 20% tax on wage income, taxpayers with
up to $10,000 in wage income might pay no taxes on capital; taxpayers with $10,000 to $50,000 in wage income might pay 10%; and
taxpayers with above $50,000 in wage income might pay 20%o. But
this system might result in income regressivity: A person with
$20,000 in capital income would pay fewer taxes than an individual
with $20,000 in labor income A more ambitious income-differentiated schedule would provide rates that were progressive between income classes, but regressive within classes. For example, such a
schedule might provide:
Total Income:
Below $20,000
Between $20 and $40,000
Over $40,000

1st $5000
20%
50%
60%

Capital Income:
2nd $5000 3rd $5000 Over $15,000
0
5% credit
20% credit
20%
0
10% credit
40%
10%
0

The desirability of this approach depends upon many factors,
such as the elasticity of labor supply, the government's information
about inframarginal behavior, and the degree of similarity in the
savings habits of members within each wage group. Differences in
savings habits within groups can produce one especially troubling
problem. An individual with low wage income might have unusually
large capital income, and thus substantial total income. The hybrid
system suggested would treat such atypical individuals too leniently.
The possibility of income regressivity cannot be eliminated in any
system of differential progressive taxes, but can only be minimized
for any particular distribution of income.
The ideal tax system, then, might even provide schedules for
capital income and wage income, with lower and more progressive
rates for capital income. Such a system might even provide a separate capital tax schedule for different wage groups. The late 1970s
49
and early 1980s saw a brief flurry of interest in such proposals.
These proposals never received serious attention, though, perhaps
49

125 CONG. REC. 229 (1979) (Statement of Sen. McClure). The Savings Act of

1979 would have provided a 50%o tax credit on savings to all taxpayers, and would have
achieved progressivity by requiring a threshold savings amount based on a percentage
of income that would increase with household income. The Savings Expansion Act of
1980, 126 CONG. REC. 1270 (1980), introduced by Sen. Roth and sponsored in the
House by Reps. Brown and Rousselot, would have imposed a single rate schedule sepa-

rately on capital and labor income. 126 CONG. REC. 1531 (1980). Another bill introduced by Rep. Rousselot and sponsored in the Senate by Senator Schmitt, would have
exempted 25% of each dollar of savings income from tax. 126 CONG. REC. 1323 (1980).
This bill would have provided different progressive tax rates for capital and income, with
lower rates on capital. See also 127 CONG. REC. 485 (1981) (report on tax incentives
without deficits and implementing plans that will stimulate savings, which Martin Feldstein proposed).

1993]

STIMULATING SAVINGS

229

because the massive tax overhaul of 1986 represented such a complete triumph of comprehensive tax base theory. Congress' loss of
interest in differentiated progressive rates is unfortunate, for as the
following suggests, such schedules would be more effective in balancing equity and efficiency than either capital taxes or the current
system of ceilings and nondiscrimination rules.
II
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT

AccouNTs

Since the early 1970s, the Code has contained provisions for
IRAs. 50 IRAs were once available to all, but since 1986 they have
been restricted to individuals not covered by employer pensions. 5 1
IRAs, however, are politically popular, and bills to revive them in
52
some form are regularly introduced in Congress.
The current tax system reveals a presumption that all items included in the tax base are subject to taxes of the same rate, and both
the IRAs now in place as well as those proposed make use of deductions. In particular, IRAs provide a deduction for contributions and
for the appreciation of this principal, though both are taxable upon
retirement. The resulting use of deductions, however, creates distributive problems because deductions are inevitably worth more to
higher income taxpayers. A deduction reduces the taxpayer's gross
income by the deductible amount and, thus, provides a benefit equal
to the tax on that deductible amount. This tax benefit is obviously
higher for those in higher tax brackets. Thus, an unrestricted IRA
would magnify the discrepancy between the savings rates of more
affluent taxpayers and less affluent taxpayers.
All current and proposed IRAs make use of ceilings. Ceilings,
as this part suggests, do not and cannot fully reverse the effects of a
50
51
52

I.R.C. § 219 (West Supp. 1992).
I.R.C. § 219(g) (West Supp. 1992).

Some bills would simply reintroduce IRAs. H.R. 1290, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 205, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Others would provide IRA-like accounts
with fewer withdrawal restrictions. For example, the Bush administration has proposed
a Family Savings Account that would, with certain income restrictions, permit tax free
accumulation on up to $2500 in annual contributions. H.R. 3972, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 202 (1990). Both the Bush administration proposal and a proposal by Senator Lloyd
Bentsen would permit tax-free transfer to certain other investments. H.R. 3972, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1990); (housing; administration proposal); S. 612, 102d Cong.,

1st Sess., § 101 (1991) (Sen. Bentsen's proposal presenting tax-free transfer and housing and education). The Bush proposal was also limited to families with incomes of less
than $120,000 per year. Id at § 292(c)(3). Modified IRA proposals that would permit
similar withdrawals include H.R. 960, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1991); H.R. 1074, 102
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1291 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1406, 102 Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1731, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2340, 102 Cong., 1st Sess.

(1991); H.R. 2478, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 381, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. § 301
(1991) (same as H.960).
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deduction, and are distributively inferior to differentiated rates. A
pure system of differentiated rates is advisable only if individuals
save rationally. If some people need paternalistic help in saving, differentiated rates might be combined with IRAs to restrict withdrawals and encourage contributions.
A.

Economic Perspectives on IRAs

IRAs have always been subject to ceilings,5 3 and no recent proposals would dispense with them. 54 A ceiling limits the benefit that
any taxpayer can receive from a deduction. The ceiling thus ensures
that the potential total tax benefit that any taxpayer can receive is a
declining fraction of income as income rises. The use of ceilings to
achieve progressivity has been advocated by those tax policy theorists who are willing to consider sullying the tax base with tax
expenditures.
Some deductions magnify the tendency of the rich to save proportionally more. The use of ceilings to compensate for this regressive tendency, however, makes little sense from an economic point
of view. Ceilings have no effect on the behavior of any individual
who is above the ceiling. Such an individual simply receives a lump
sum transfer in return for doing something that he would have done
without the subsidy. Since individuals above the ceiling are likely to
be more affluent, a deduction with a ceiling produces an extremely
unfortunate combination of effects. The deduction provides a
transfer to the affluent while the ceiling removes any incentive for
them to save. Indeed, critics of IRAs have argued that they provide
no new savings, but merely a shifting of assets. 5 5 Various tax provisions and proposals have reduced the regressive effect of deductions
by providing a credit, but these provisions and proposals have undermined their own potential to stimulate savings by imposing a
56
ceiling.
I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
See Stephan, supra note 48.
R. Glenn Hubbard, Do IRAs and Keoghs Increase Savings?, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 43
(1984); Gale & Scholz, IRAs and Household Savings (July 16, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
56
See, e.g., Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 § 404, I.R.C. § 116 (repealed
1986); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 301, I.R.C.§ 128 (repealed 1990). An
ingenious proposal by Senator Bradley would have avoided this problem by providing a
credit, with an annual ceiling, for net savings. 127 CONG. REc. 12,824-26 (1981). Such a
credit would be efficient, but seems somewhat inequitable. A frugal low bracket taxpayer who, prior to passage of the proposal, had put aside a nest egg of $20,000, would
not receive a tax benefit unless he added to this year's savings, while a high bracket
profligate would receive a credit for the first $2000 of savings he put away after the bill's
passage.
53

54
55
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A deduction with a ceiling, then, has no marginal effect above
the ceiling on savings. A system of differentiated rates would avoid
this problem. The ideal differentiated rates would be regressive
with respect to capital income within classes but progressive with
respect to income across classes. Such a structure would reduce the
transfer to the well-to-do while creating marginal incentives to save.
Differential rates that are not regressive with income classes will
provide a greater transfer to the well-to-do, but will at least create a
marginal income to save. 57
B.

A Paternalistic Perspective

The economic theory of rational behavior has proven to be a
useful tool for analyzing and predicting individual behavior. Yet
economic assumptions seem less than wholly applicable to the activity of savings for retirement. Even an efficient and fair system of
differentiated rates would only partially blunt the tendency of the
rich to save proportionally more than the poor. This fact is of little
interest to economists, who defer completely to individual tastes.
Economic theory places only formal restrictions on preferences, and
does not purport to pass judgement on individual tastes: Rocky and
Resnais, Twinkies and tiramisu are as one in the utility calculus.
Forcing the middle class to save at the same rate as the rich is no
more warranted than forcing them to watch "Last Year at
Marienbad."
But the differential savings rates of the poor seem of great consequence to legislators, and some neoclassicals are plainly uncomfortable with the conclusion that all savings choices are equally
sensible. 58 Recent empirical evidence has suggested that individual
choices do not always conform to economic assumptions.5 9 Ration57 See supra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 24-30 (1960). See also BSHMBAWERK, supra note 41, at 253-59; Martin Feldstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security, Q.

J. ECON. 303 (1985); F. P. Ramsey, A MathematicalTheory of Savings, 38 ECON.J. 543, 541
(1928); Roy F. HARROD, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS 40 (1948).

59 In general, a set of individual choices can be the result of preference maximization if and only if, when choosing between bundle A and bundle B on different occasions, the consumer consistently chooses the same one. If the consumer sometimes
chooses A and sometimes B, his choices are said to be inconsistent. In the intertemporal
setting, the existence of inconsistency justifies paternalism. See George Ainslie, Specious
Reward A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Self-control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463-96
(1975) (animals); George Ainslie & Vanda Haendel, The Motives of the Will, in ETIOLOGIC
ASPECTS OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 119 (Edward Gottheil et al. eds., 1983); Uri Benzion et al., Discount Rates Inferredfrom Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGlMT. SCI. 270
(1989); A. W. Logue, Research on Self-Control: An Integrating Framework, 11 BEHAV. AND
BRAIN SCI. 665 (1988) (animals); Andrew Millar & Douglas J. Navarick, Self-control and
Choice in Humans: Effects of Video Game Playing as a Positive Reinforcer, 15 LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION 361 (1984); Douglas J. Navarick, Negative Reinforcement and Choice in Humans,
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ality may fail in several different ways. First, the individual may have
60
preferences that change solely because of the passage of time.
6
The resulting behavior roughly corresponds to impatience. ' Second, the individual may have preferences that change solely with the
proximity of various items of consumption. Such behavior might be
called impulsiveness. 6 2 An impatient or impulsive individual may
fail to maximize his own welfare. That individual's welfare may be
improved by paternalistic intervention.
The objectives of paternalistic policy are quite different from
those of policy based on the assumption of rationality. The tools,
however, may be the same. Differential rates may successfilly correct impatience, for the behavior of an impatient individual is much
13 LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 361 (1982) (discussing negative noise reinforcement with
adults); Jay U. Solnick et al., An ExperimentalAnalysis of Impulsivity and Impulse Control in
Humans, 11 LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 61 (1980) (same); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETrERS 201 (1981).
60 For example, suppose that on February 1, an individual will receive $100. On
January 1, a month earlier, the individual is required to contribute the money to an IRA
or to spend it on dinner in an elegant restaurant. On January 1, the individual will
choose to contribute the funds to an IRA, yet given the same choice on February 1, he
would have chosen the dinner. This behavior, which violates economic theory, may result from a computational error. That is, in discounting the future pleasure from the
IRA and the meal, he makes a computational mistake that reverses his choices although
his choices would have remained the same had he calculated correctly. Time-inconsistent preferences were first analyzed in R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic
Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. SrUD. 165 (1957).
61 In the previous example, the individual's preferences between the dinner and the
IRA reverse as the prospect of the dinner grows closer and it becomes more tempting.
Experimental studies strongly suggest that at least some inconsistency results from impatience. Such studies have shown that individuals sometimes make precommitments,
that is, they deliberately reduce the choices that will be available to them in the future.
See, e.g., Howard Rachlin & Leonard Green, Commitment, Choice and Self-control, 17 J. ExPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS oF BEHAV. 15 (1972). An agent who fears his preferences may
change has an incentive to precommit, while one who is imperfectly rational has no
motive to restrict his future options.
62 Continuing with the earlier example, suppose that the individual is asked on February 1 to make the choice between a good meal and an IRA contribution in two different situations: sitting in a bank and sitting in a restaurant. Even an individual who
chooses the IRA contribution if seated in the bank may choose the meal when he is
actually sitting in the restaurant. Impulsiveness is related to both individual and situational variables. The crucial situational variables are those that focus attention on or
distract it from the object of temptation. These so-called attentional factors may be part
of the externally determined situation, Walter Mischel, Cognitive andAdditional Mechanisms
in Delay of Gratification,21J. PERSONALrrY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 204-18 (1972), but they may
also be part of self-initiated, self-control schemes. For example, subjects confronted
with the immediate temptation of a reward in front of their eyes may distract their own
attention through daydreams and fantasies. Marcia C. Rodriguez et al., Cognitive Person
Variables in the Delay of Gratification of Older Children at Risk, 57 J. PERSONALrrY AND Soc.
PSYCHOL. 358 (1989). Therefore, thoughts that distract attention from both the immediate and the deferred reward will increase the capacity to delay. However, factors that
focus attention on the abstract, non-arousing characteristics of the reward can facilitate
delay. Walter Mischel & Nancy Baker, Cognitive Appraisals and Transformations in Delay Behavior, 31 J. PERSONALTY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 254 (1975).
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like that of the neoclassical consumer. He chooses consumption
levels at which marginal costs and benefits are equaled, and he adjusts these levels in response to price changes, such as those induced by a direct tax subsidy. However, if individuals are impatient,
the ideal rate difference between capital income and labor income
should be greater, and perhaps more progressive, 63 than if individuals are rational. With impatient individuals, the differential rates
should not only serve a distributive function but should also compensate for the high discount rate.
A concern about impulsiveness explains why Congress might
prefer IRAs to an unrestricted differential rate structure. Impulsiveness may be unaffected by differential rates since the response of
impulsive individuals depends on factors other than the monetary
value of the incentives. In particular, impulsive individuals are influenced by situational factors, such as liquidity. An incentive to save
may be ineffective if it does not restrict the impulsive individual's
access to liquid assets, such as money in a bank account. Impulsive
individuals are by definition overly sensitive to situational influences. Thus, relatively abstract rewards, such as a higher return created by differential rate, may seem insignificant compared to the
more vivid pleasures of an imminent good meal.64
Current IRAs partially compensate for impulsiveness by restricting the holder's ability to withdraw funds. The ability of IRAs
to correct impulsiveness, though, could be strengthened by techniques that might be called precommitment and distraction. A
precommitment strategy might, for example, require a taxpayer to
commit to transfer a certain amount each week into an IRA or other
account from which withdrawal is not permitted. In distraction
techniques, the individual's attention is diverted from the object of
temptation. Experimental psychology confirms the common-sense
observation that removing temptation tends to increase self-control.
Thus, a payroll savings plan that automatically deposits funds to a
63 No direct evidence exists linking inconsistency to income, although some studies
indirectly suggest a link. Situational inconsistency seems to be connected to certain individual variables. Of particular importance is IQ. See Rodriguez et al., supra note 62, at
365. See also Mischel & Metzner, supra note 44, at 161. IQ also seems to be related to
knowledge of distraction techniques, although it plays a role independent of such knowledge. Rodriguez et al., supra note 62. The connection between IQ and inconsistency
provides indirect evidence of a link between income and inconsistency. Whatever performance intelligence tests measures, high scores on such tests are strongly correlated
to wages. Thus, savings rates and wage income have a common correlate.
64 Gene Steuerle, Super IRAs Wrong Curefor Sickly Savings Rate, 51 TAx NoTEs 923
(1991) ("Through pension plans, employers often set aside significant amounts for employees who otherwise might never save for themselves. The expansion of IRA-type
options eventually weakens the incentives and demand for employer-based plans.").
Even voluntary employer plans offer the advantages of precommitment. 132 CONG. REC.
4857 (1986) (remarks of Stuart Brahs).
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savings account might increase savings, even if the plan permitted
individuals to withdraw freely money from the savings account.
Money in a savings account, unlike money in a checking account,
does not constantly remind the individual of his spending power.
Employer pension plans provide such precommitment and distraction arrangements automatically. At present, financial institutions
administering IRAs often do not employ these devices, but there is
no reason why they could not.
III
EMPLOYER PENSIONS

Current tax policy toward savings favors employer pensions, especially pensions that do not allow workers to choose their own contribution levels. 65 This preference stems in part from paternalistic
concerns. 66 Neither conventional IRAs nor elective employer plans
seem wholly adequate to remedy the problems of impatience and
impulsiveness. Moreover, employer plans provide more opportunities than IRAs for countering the distributive problems created by
the use of deductions. In particular, the Code seeks to redistribute
through the so-called nondiscrimination rules. In this Part I argue
that a system of pension plans would inevitably meet both paternalistic and distributive goals less effectively than would a system of
modified IRAs using differentiated rates.
Part III.A. argues that as long as a deduction is used as the basic
subsidy mechanism, no regulatory structure can achieve ideal coverage levels. Part III.B. argues that even a system of differentiated
rates will be difficult to adminster using employer pension plans.
However, if political pressures prevent Congress from abandoning
employer pensions, then these pensions should at least use em65

Employer pensions can be of several types, each subject to a separate regulatory

regime. Employee participation in these plans is often nonelective. Other plans rely on
voluntary employee contributions either to supplement the main nonelective plan, or
through a separate "cash-or-deferred-arrangement" (CODA). I.R.C. § 401(k) (West
Supp. 1992). The ceiling on allowable annual contributions for CODAs is $7000. I.R.C.
§ 4 02(g)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Voluntary contributions to basic plans are further disadvantaged by the fact that they must be made from after-tax income, so that only the
appreciation accumulates tax free. For nonelective plans, contributions to a defined
contribution plan generally cannot exceed the lesser of $30,000 or 25% of the participant's compensation or until a pension annuity of $90,000 per year is reached. I.R.C.
§ 415(c) (West Supp. 1992). A defined benefit plan cannot provide benefits greater than
the lesser of $90,000 or 100% of the individual's average salary for his three highest
paid years. I.R.C. § 415(b) (West Supp. 1992). By combining defined contribution and
defined benefit plans, an individual can generally accrue more pension wealth than by
using either alone, although it is not possible to deduct the full amounts permitted by
either type of plan alone. I.R.C. § 415(e) (West Supp. 1992).
66 Deborah M. Weiss, PaternalisticPension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic
Theory, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 1275 (1991).
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ployer-based differentiated rates. These differentiated rates would
have to be modified to take into account various complications created by the use of employers.
A.

The Nondiscrimination Rules

Like the tax subsidy to IRAs, the tax subsidy to employer pensions has as its central feature a deduction. Like the IRA subsidy,
the pension subsidy provides a tax deduction to contributions and
appreciation while it taxes withdrawals at retirement. Employer
pensions, though, are subject to a set of regulations that do not apply to IRAs. In an attempt to undo the inverted distributive effects
of deductions, Congress has granted tax-favored status only to
those pension plans that meet the so-called nondiscrimination rules.
These rules, however, fail to compensate for the use of a deduction
and seldom produce socially desirable coverage levels.
The nondiscrimination rules for nonelective plans 67 have two
basic components. The first, the uniform benefit rules component,
restricts the variations in benefits payable to covered workers, thus
creating a presumption that benefits bear a proportional relation to
compensation. 68 The second component of the nondiscrimination
rules, the coverage rules, restricts the firm's freedom to exclude
workers from coverage. The coverage rules are an attempt to rectify
problems created by the use of a deduction as a basic tax subsidy
mechanism. These rules condition receipt of the subsidy on coverage of those whom the firm might have no incentive to cover. I will
refer to this approach to distributing the subsidy as a conditional
subsidy rule. Unfortunately, even the best possible conditional subsidy will fail to produce the desired distributional effects. The basic
problem is the use of a deduction to dole out the subsidy. The total
value of deductions is not systematically related to the amount
needed to induce the desired level of coverage. Consequently, no
67 Historically most pension plans have provided nonelective benefits. Although
voluntary contributions to employer plans are disfavored relative to nonelective plans,
they are more generously subsidized than IRAs. Congress apparently believes that the
disadvantages of voluntarism are partly offset by the fact that even voluntary contributions to employer plans can be governed by the nondiscrimination rules. See, e.g., 132
CONG. REC. 4858 (1986) (remarks of Stuart Brahs). In nonelective employer-sponsored
pension plans, the nondiscrimination requirement can be imposed directly; covered employees are not permitted to choose between wages and pension contributions, and
must meet guidelines specifying the proportions of less-compensated to highly compensated employees covered. Voluntary contributions, though, are under the control of the
employee. Since the employee's use of the plan is not entirely under the employer's
control, implementing the nondiscrimination rules is more difficult. Such plans must
meet after-the-fact nondiscrimination tests, that is, the actual percent deferred must not
be biased towards highly compensated employees.

68

I.R.C. § 401(a)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
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conditional subsidy can induce full coverage in some cases or prevent excess subsidies in others.
Consider what the best possible conditional subsidy rule would
look like. Under the system of deductions, if the firm chooses to
cover some highly compensated workers, it will receive more than
the socially optimal subsidy rate. Conversely, it will receive less
than the optimal rate if it chooses to cover less highly compensated
workers. A conditional subsidy rule requires the firm to cover some
of the less compensated workers in return for receiving the subsidy
for covering the more compensated workers. The firm should be
required to cover those extra workers whom it would cover under a
system of differential rates, so long as it is not required to incur
costs in excess of the tax benefits received.
The ideal rule can be examined through some simplifying assumptions. Suppose that the firm employs a given number of highly
compensated workers, hc, and a given number of non-highly compensated workers, nhc. All members of each group earn the same
wage and all workers wish to save the same proportion of their income. However, the deduction subsidy is in excess of the level
needed to produce optimal coverage for highly compensated workers and insufficient to induce optimal coverage for nonhighly-compensated workers. The loss on each non-highly compensated
workers is L, and the surplus on each highly compensated worker is
S.
To guarantee maximum coverage, the ideal conditional subsidy
rule would compare the total benefit from covering highly compensated workers, hc(S), with the loss from covering all non-highly compensated workers, nhc(L). If hc(S) > nhc(L), then the firm should be
required to cover all non-highly compensated workers. Suppose
nhc* is the number of non-highly compensated workers that the firm
is required to cover, and hc* is the number of highly compensated
workers that the firm chooses to cover. If hc(S) < nhc(L), then the
firm should be required to cover the number of non-highly compensated workers nhc* such that the total loss on these workers equals
the total surplus from high income workers.
(1) hc(S) = nhc*(L)
Rearranging (1), the number of non-highly compensated workers
covered must be the lesser of all non-highly compensated workers,
or
(2) nhc* = hc(S/L)
Suppose, for example, that the excess tax subsidy that Firms A and B
receive from providing the optimal pensions for each high income
worker is $6,000, while each firm would need $2,000 in excess tax
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subsidy to induce it to provide optimal pension coverage to each
non-highly compensated worker. Thus, the subsidy available for
each highly compensated worker could finance the pensions of
three 69 non-highly compensated workers. Suppose that Firm A has
500 highly compensated workers and 1000 non-highly compensated
workers. The subsidy to the highly compensated workers can finance 1500 pensions for non-highly compensated workers. 70
Since Firm A only has 1000 non-highly compensated workers, it
surely should not be required to cover 1500 non-highly compensated workers. So the ideal rules thus stipulate that the firm must
cover the lesser of all its non-highly compensated or the amount
specified in equation (1). Firm A can then be required to cover all
1000 non-highly compensated workers as a condition of receiving
the subsidy for its highly compensated workers.
Suppose, in contrast to Firm A, Firm B has 250 highly compensated workers and 1000 non-highly compensated workers. For Firm
B, the excess subsidy to highly compensated workers can only finance pensions for 750 non-highly compensated income workers,
71
less than the total number of non-highly compensated workers.
Firm B will simply choose not to provide a qualified plan if, in return
for a tax deduction for all highly compensated workers, it must provide a pension for all non-highly compensated workers. If Firm B is
required to cover fewer workers, the government will fail to extract
the maximum value from the subsidy dollar. 7 2
Even the best possible conditional subsidy rule cannot repair
the damage from a deduction based subsidy. Some workers in Firm
B are not covered, even though it would be socially optimal to do so.
If required to provide coverage at the optimal point, firms such as B,
69

$6000/$2000.

70
71

hc(S/L) = 500(3) = 1500.
hc(S/L) = 250(3) = 750.

72
The analysis in this Part assumes a given number of workers at various wage
levels. A complete analysis would take into account the fact that employers may respond
to the nondiscrimination rules by reducing their demand for less highly compensated
workers. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-DiscriminationProvisionsDesirable?,55 U. CM. L. REV. 790, 805-14 (1988). While Bankman's
analysis accounts for the conditional subsidy aspect of the nondiscrimination rules, this
Article ignores potential labor demand effects. The two analyses are complementary. A
peculiar correlation exists between firm size and benefits, even without the conditional
subsidy rule. Id. at 821-25. It does not allow for the possibility of some transfer between worker groups, as occurs with a conditional subsidy rule. Bankman correctly criticizes the belief that "a free lunch" is implicit in the nondiscrimination rules. Id. at 805.
Nevertheless, the conditional subsidy nevertheless does cause some transfer to occur.
This surplus is ordinarily kept by the firm, although it could be distributed to employees.
Note, however, that under the assumption of perfect rationality, any distribution to
workers should be a pure cash grant, since workers can be trusted to make their own
savings decisions. Whether the surplus is kept by the firm or redistributed to workers, it
must be financed by other distortionary taxes and, thus, it is inefficient.
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with a large number of non-highly compensated employees, will
simply not provide a plan. The ideal rule, therefore, must be subject to the provision that the firm will not lose money. Conversely,
firms such as A, with large numbers of highly compensated employees, may be able to cover all their non-highly compensated employees without absorbing all the excess benefits paid to highly
compensated employees. Only by coincidence will all non-highly
compensated employees be covered without excess subsidy. Some
critics of the present system have proposed lower ceilings on subsidies to highly compensated workers. Lower ceilings, though, will
reduce the size of the surplus, regardless of the size of the deficit
that must be covered.
The ideal rule states that the firm should cover the socially optimal number of workers subject to a break-even constraint. Such a
rule must be stated in terms of the relative number of workers in
each group who should be covered. Depending on the estimates of
costs and wage offsets, the ideal rule might require firms to cover,
for example, 1.2 less highly compensated workers for each more
highly compensated, or 1, or .6. Ideal conditioned subsidy rules fail
to achieve universal coverage, but they extract the maximum coverage given an imperfect subsidy-if the deduction provides the firm
with an incentive to cover at least some workers, then the firm would
cover those workers and any surplus would be used to cover additional workers.
The current non-discrimination rules fail to meet even this limited goal. The basic coverage rule requires that the percentage of
non-highly compensated employees covered be a specified proportion K of the highly compensated employees 73 covered. 74 Thus:
(3) nhc*/nhc = (hc*/hc)K
Rearranging (3), the required number of non-highly compensated workers who must be covered is
73 I.R.C. § 414(a) defines a highly compensated employee according to three separate criteria: absolute salary, relative salary, and control over the corporation. A highly
compensated employee is one who in the preceding year: (a) was at any time a 5%
owner of employer; or (b) received an indexed salary of more than $75,000; or (c) received an indexed salary of over $50,000 and was in the top 20% of salaries within firm;
or (d) was an officer who received compensation exceeding 50% of the maximum annual
benefit under I.R.C. § 415 (c)(1)(A).
74
Specifically, the number of less highly compensated workers that must be covered is equal to 70% of the highly compensated workers covered. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1).
The primary concern is whether the conditional subsidy rule should be framed in terms
of the relative number of workers covered or the relative proportion of workers covered.
Estimating the appropriate relationship presents a difficult empirical question for either
a numerical or a proportional rule. Permanent part time employees and employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement are also excluded from the minimum participation and coverage tests. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(26)(B)(i), 410(b)(3)(A).
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(4) nhc* = (hc*)K(nhc/hc)
If the required proportion K is the cost ratio S/L, this equation becomes the correct equation (2) multiplied by the ratio of non-highly
compensated workers to highly compensated workers:
(5) nhc* = hc*(S/L)(nhc/hc)
75
Only when the ratio nhc/hc is one-to-one will the rule be optimal.
For firms with high proportions of low-income workers, the ratio is
higher than one-to-one, and equation (2) imposes too high a burden. As a result, these firms fail to provide plans at all. When the
nhc/hc ratio is lower than one-to-one, firms can satisfy the rule while
leaving some non-highly compensated workers uncovered. These
firms thus receive a net surplus from covering highly compensated
76
workers.
The ideal rule, then, should be stated in terms of the relative
number of low-income workers covered, rather than in terms of the
absolute number. Of course, to implement this principle perfectly
requires a great deal of information. The above example assumed
that the government had perfect information about the total loss
from covering non-highly compensated workers and the surplus
benefits of covering highly compensated workers. This, in turn, required information about the costs of covering the two classes of
workers, the wage offset that various workers will take, and the
number of workers of each class. In practice, though, only the
number of workers at each income level is known with certainty;
costs and wage offsets must be estimated. These estimates introduce two problems: (1) a reliable estimate may be difficult to make,
and (2) actual numbers may differ between firms, thus making it dif77
ficult to formulate a uniform rule.
Any rule stated in relative rather than absolute terms will be an
improvement over the present situation. But any non-discrimination rules can correct only imperfectly because of the present upside-down system of subsidies. Ceilings are likewise an ineffective
tool for undoing the distributional effects of upside down subsidies.
75
A nhc/hc ratio of one-to-one yields the optimal equation (2) because K=S/L.
With a different K, the value of nhc/hc that will produce equation (2) will be different,
but the basic problem will remain: For firms above this level of nhc/hc, equation (5) will
present too high an obligation, and for firms below this level it will present too low an
obligation.
76
Commentators have noted the difficulties in designing a fully optimal nondiscrimination rule. These commentators, however, have advocated either an end to the
nondiscrimination rules, the imposition of mandatory plans, or both. See Bruce Wolk,
Non-Discriminationin Contributionsor Benefits: The New Regulations, 25 GA. L. REv. 71, 7374, 88-90 (1990). No commentator has questioned the basic structure of the subsidy.
77
Nevertheless, cost and wage offsets are likely to be well-connected with income,
reducing variations between firms.
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If consumers are rational, then, a system of differential rates would
be vastly superior to the present system. The possibility of imperfect rationality suggests that a system of modified IRAs should be
used in conjunction with differential rates. Even with imperfect rationality though, employer pensions would serve no purpose at
78
all.
B.

Differentiated Subsidies Administered Through Employers

If Congress could write on a clean slate, it would have no reason to use employer pensions to promote retirement security. But
the system of employer pensions is now entrenched, and employers
would, no doubt, vigorously oppose any attempt to replace it with
IRAs. Congress might continue to use employer pensions while
substituting differentiated rates for the present regime of deductions, subject to nondiscrimination rules. This approach, though,
would have problems that a differential rate IRA would avoid.
These special problems could be reduced, but not eliminated, by
manipulating the rate structure. Still, differential-rate employer
pensions are superior to the present system, and may be the best
arrangement that is politically feasible.
1. Labor-ManagementMotives for Pensions
The previous Part assumed that, absent government intervention, the level of employer pensions was determined by worker demand for savings, the same force that determined IRA
contributions. But though worker demand surely contributes to
78

The conclusion that pensions would serve no purpose whatsoever may be quali-

fied by the possibility that an individual's propensity to save is susceptible to influences
from environmental and social factors. See generally Albert Bandura & Walter Mischel,
Modification of Self-Imposed Delay to Reward through Exposure to Live and Symbolic Models, 2 J.
PERSONALrrY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 698 (1965) (reporting that subjects who observe models engaged in delay will tend to imitate that delay); Walter Mischel, Father-Absence and
Delay of Gratification: Cross-CulturalComparisons, 63 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 116
(1961) (indicating that cultural factors play an important role in gratification delay);
Walter Mischel et al., Cognitive and Attentional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification, 10 J.
PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 381 (1972) (concluding that subjects instructed to engage in self-distraction strategies are more able to delay gratification than others).
Thus, employer pensions may serve an educational function by encouraging delay. To
ensure that they meet the nondiscrimination rules, employers often encourage employee participation in voluntary plans through informational meetings, and other
events. Some have interpreted the fact that pension wealth does not seem to offset private savings as evidence that pensions function as an educational device by providing
information about retirement savings plans. See, e.g., PHILIP CAGAN, THE EFFECT OF PENSION PLANS ON AGGREGATE SAVING 5-6, 53-54 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Occasional Paper 95, 1965). Others have suggested that the possibility of success raises
aspirations. See, e.g., GEORGE KATONA, PRIVATE PENSIONS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS 4-6,
73-75 (1965). Finally, many feel that financial institutions' advertising of IRAs has also
increased savings. Gray, supra note 8, at 807.
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pensions, employers have their own reasons for providing pensions,
and the conflict between employer objectives and savings policy
complicates the design of the proper rate structure.
Pensions are valuable to employers because they can be incorporated easily into a long term employment contract. Firms may
sometimes wish to enter into long-term labor contracts, as opposed
to short-term, or spot-market contracts, in order to screen or reduce
turnover. In a spot-market labor contract, the marginal product of
each period's labor is equal to the wage that the worker receives for
that period. In a long-term contract, the total value of the worker's
labor for all periods must equal the total value of wage payments,
but this relationship need not hold for any given period. Reducing
turnover and screening workers both require long-term contracts, in
which an employee is paid less than his individual marginal product
in the early years of employment and more than his individual marginal product in later years. Pensions, obviously, provide a convenient way to defer compensation.
Current pension policy tries to free ride on a firm's use of pensions to manage its work force. The government permits firms to
impose vesting periods on pensions. 79 These vesting periods increase the pensions' value in screening and discouraging turnover.
The firm is willing to pay for the value of this labor management
device, thus reducing the government's cost of providing pensions.
Yet this free ride complicates the use of employer pensions as a tool
to subsidize savings.
The use of pensions to screen workers tends to exacerbate class
differences in savings propensities. Firms may wish to screen for
several kinds of problems, but all are typically associated with higher
wage jobs. In general, more highly paid jobs involve more discretion, and employee performance is likely to be more difficult to
monitor directly. In higher wage jobs, pensions may be used to reduce shirking by providing an interval of low-wage time in which
shirkers can be detected and discharged. A deferred bonus may also
be used to screen well matched and poorly matched workers. Even
the most talented and diligent worker may be ill-suited to a particular job, yet this may not be apparent until after a substantial period
of employment. During the early years of employment, all workers
can be paid a wage equal to the marginal product of a poorly
matched worker, and well-matched workers can eventually be re79 Under the old ERISA rule, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (amended 1986), pensions
were permitted to have ten-year cliff vesting or fifteen-year graded vesting. (A pension
with cliff vesting is totally forfeitable until it vests). Current law permits five-year cliff
vesting or seven-year graded vesting. Slightly more lenient rules apply to multi-employer plans.
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warded with a wage bonus. 80 The employer's need to determine
how well the worker suits his job is presumably highest in jobs that
require special skills. These skills are, in turn, likely to be reflected
in the worker's wage.
Firms can also use pensions to reduce worker turnover. Firms
invest money in training workers. Training that can be transferred
between firms is sometimes referred to as general human capital.
Firms can usually force workers to bear the cost of this investment
by reducing their wages, since the worker can always sell the resulting skills to another firm. In contrast, training that cannot be transferred between firms is sometimes referred to as specific human
capital. Firms must generally bear the cost of this investment, since
workers would lose their investment if they were fired. Firms, therefore, are potentially at the mercy of employees who quit before the
firm's investment in them is recouped. Pension vesting schedules
can be structured to discourage turnover by imposing large pension
forfeitures on early departure. Thus, unvested pension wealth
should reduce turnover. 8 1 Typically, jobs that require a great deal
of firm-specific training are skilled and highly paid. Thus, the use of
pensions to protect investments in firm-specific human capital di8 2
rects pensions to high income workers.
The present system attempts to exploit the firm's desire to provide pensions for its own labor management purposes. Because the
firm benefits from the pension, it is willing to contribute to the cost
of providing the pension. But this contribution is obtained at a
price. Firm contributions are targeted to high-income employees,
80
Although screening has not received as much attention in the pension literature
as the human capital theory, see infra note 81 and accompanying text, the relationship
between the two emerges in the literature exploring the connection between screening
and wage deferral. See, e.g., Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REV. EcoN. STUD. 315 (1982); BoyanJovanovic,Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972 (1979).
81
GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrAL 34-35 (2d ed. 1975); Edward P. Lazear & Robert L. Moore, Pensions and Turnover, in PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 163 (Zvi Bodie et
al. eds., 1988); Douglas A. Wolf & Frank Levy, Pension Coverage, Pension Vesting, and the
DistributionofJob Tenures, in RETIREMENT AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 23 (HarryJ. Aaron &
Gary Burtless eds., 1984).
82 Even if firms had no labor management motive for supplying pensions, pension
coverage patterns would reflect more than differences in individual worker demand for
pensions. Instituting a pension plan requires substantial fixed costs, and once a plan is
instituted it may be cost effective for an employer to include otherwise uncovered employees. Fixed costs also seem to be associated with assuming pension obligations towards an individual employee: pension records, for example, must be maintained long
after the employee has left the company, and the firm has continuing legal obligations to
the employee in the event of plan termination or bankruptcy. Employees, however, derive utility only from the level of benefits paid and only these benefits will therefore be
accepted to offset wages. Employers may therefore be reluctant to incur these fixed
costs unless a threshold benefit level is reached.
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adding to the problems caused by the higher savings propensities of
the affluent. A more steeply progressive tax rate structure is needed
to induce firms to provide pensions to low income workers.
The government's reliance on firm contributions not only
skews pension coverage toward the affluent, but also diminishes the
value of the pension promise. Because vesting periods make the
pension more valuable to the firm, the firm is willing to underwrite a
higher proportion of pension costs. But the vesting periods substantially reduce worker security. Full and immediate vesting would
increase the value of a pension to the workers but decrease the value
to the firm. If firms were required to provide pensions with full and
immediate vesting, they would reduce their pension contribution.
To restore contributions to their previous level, an increased subsidy would be required, yet the cost of this subsidy might well be
justified by the benefits of greater retirement security.
2.

Small Firms

The implementation of differential rates through employers is
further complicated, not only by the use of pensions as labor management devices, but also by the special problems faced by small
firms. Small firms, often unsophisticated or uncertain about their
prospects, may be reluctant to enter into long term financial obligations like pension plans. Even without the regulatory provisions of
the Code, small firms would be less likely to provide pensions.
Yet many aspects of the current tax subsidy actually aggravate
the problems faced by small firms. Many of these provisions are responses to the use of deductions to subsidize pensions. The topheavy provisions of the Code, for example, impose tougher requirements on plans that direct a significant proportion of their benefits
to individuals with control of the corporation's affairs, 8 3 regardless
of whether these plans meet the income-based nondiscrimination
rules. 84 Congress presumably believes that devices to evade the
83
A top-heavy plan is defined as one in which 60% of benefits go to key employees.
These plans must meet three additional requirements. First, they must provide specified
minimum contributions for plan participants who are not key employees. These contributions must equal the lesser of a 3% defined contribution or the percent given to key
employees. Second, they must vest more rapidly than ordinary plans. Third, there are
special limitations on contributions.
84 The definitions of "key employee" and of "highly compensated employee" include elements of both control and compensation. The definition of key employee focuses on control, while that of highly compensated employee focuses on salary. A key
employee is defined as: (1) an officer with compensation exceeding 50% of the dollar
limit for defined benefit plans; (2) an employee with (a) at least 1/2%o interest in the firm
and one of the ten largest interests in the firm and (b) annual compensation in excess of
defined contribution limits (currently $30,000); (3) a 5% owner of employer; (4) a 1%
owner of employer having annual compensation in excess of $150,000. An individual
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nondiscrimination rules are not always easily detected, but that one
sign of such evasion is the receipt of disproportionate benefits by
those in control. The top-heavy rules, however, fall hardest on
small businesses.8 5 As a firm grows in size, the number of control
group employees grows at a slower rate than the number of total
employees. Thus, a small firm's pension plan will generally cover a
higher proportion of employees who can be characterized as having
control. The need for top-heavy rules and the corresponding burden on small business could be eliminated with a system of differential subsidies. Differential rates would create a direct incentive to
cover low-income workers. No supplementary rules would be
needed. The subsidy for any worker would be designed only to
meet the costs of covering that worker, not to cross-subsidize other
workers.
Small firms are also burdened by various requirements imposed
on affiliated businesses run by owner-employees. The definition of
owner-employees includes only sole proprietors or partners.8 6 Sole
proprietorships and partnerships are typically smaller than corporations, and thus, the owner-employee rules apply primarily to small
businesses. Affiliated enterprises run by owner-employees are subject to especially stringent non-discrimination rules. Affiliated employers must, in general, meet the nondiscrimination rules jointly;
otherwise, a firm could evade the nondiscrimination rules by creating shell companies and segregating in one of them workers whom
it did not wish to cover. 8 7 An exception is provided for such employers who operate separate lines of business; such employers are
permitted to apply the minimum coverage rules of I.R.C. § 410(b)
to each line of business. 88 This separate line of business exception,
however, is of limited use to owner-employees: Owner-employees
may not be covered by a plan unless employees of any other trade or
business they own are covered by a comparable plan.8 9 Presumably,
the chances of manipulation by shifting workers are thought to be
greater in an unincorporated business, unfettered by the business
constraints of shareholders. Again, the use of differential rates
would obviate the need for this rule and its burden on small busiwith a high salary but no control might be highly compensated but not a key employee,
while an individual with control but low salary may be a key employee but not highly
compensated. I.R.C. § 416.
85 See, e.g., Robert E. Helm & Brian P. Goldstein, Pension/Reform Simplification-An
Urgent Need: PracticalProposalsfrom the Front Lines, 25 GA. L. REv. 91, 95-96 (1990) (urging repeal of top-heavy rules).
86 I.R.C. § 401(c)(3).
87 I.R.C. § 414(b).
88
The plan must nevertheless satisfy nondiscrimination requirements, apparently
on an employee-wide basis. I.R.C. § 410(b)(5).
89 I.R.C. § 401(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(l)(1).
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ness because the incentive to shift employees disappears when no
cross-subsidy is used.
Small businesses are also burdened by the minimum participation rules. A plan must benefit at least the lesser of 50 employees or
40% of all employees.9 0 Obviously, this requirement can more easily be met by larger firms since 50 employees may be a small percentage of a large firm's work force. This bias is increased further
by the interaction of the minimum participation rules with the special provisions for multiple plans. Multiple plans can help workers
as well as employers since the same type of plan may not be best for
all employees. Highly compensated workers might want a defined
contribution plan, while less highly compensated workers might
want a defined benefit plan. Recognizing this, the nondiscrimination rules permit an employer to aggregate two plans with different

formula types as long as the two together meet the uniformity
rules. 91 Multiple plans can also be used to exchange uniform benefits for broader coverage. 92 To prevent excessive division, each
component plan must separately meet participation requirements;
that is, each must have 50 employees or 40%o of the work force.
This rule reduces regulatory costs for the administrative agency.
Benefits of different types are not easy to compare, and large num-

bers of small plans create an unmanageable burden for the
agency.9 3 Yet the brunt of this rule plainly falls harder on smaller

firms. Differential rates would eliminate the need for participation
rules by obviating the need for nondiscrimination rules.
Yet other rules burden small firms simply by their complexity. 94
The rules permitting integration with Social Security, for example,
90 I.R.C. § 401(a)(26).
91 I.R.C. § 410(b)(6)(B) permits employers to designate two or more plans as a single plan for purposes of the nondiscrimination rules.
92 An employer may provide non-uniform benefits if they satisfy either of two regimes. First, it may provide two plans, each of which separately meets the ratio-percent
rule on its own. Alternatively, the firm may make use of the average benefit rule, I.R.C.
§§ 410(b)(1)(C), 410(b)(2). The average benefit test provides a way of getting "credit"
for a pension provided in one plan as a method for determining whether other plans
meet nondiscrimination rules. The average benefit of all non-highly compensated employees, whether or not included in any plan, must be at least 707 of the average benefit of all highly compensated employees. Within a given plan, benefits must meet the
proportionality rule. The average benefits test requires the plan to meet nondiscrimination requirements, usually through a safe harbor rule. In any case, each plan must meet
the minimum participation rules separately, which should be easier for larger employers.
93 Separate benefit structures are usually treated as separate plans. I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(26)(I). Some have argued that the minimum participation rules are dispensable. Helm & Goldstein, supra note 85, at 95-96.
94 See generally Helm & Goldstein, supra note 85, at 91 (arguing for the simplification
of pension rules by repeal of various provisions of the I.R.C.).
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partly lighten the uniformity requirement. 95 These integration rules
are fiendishly complicated, and thus small firms have difficulty taking advantage of them. Differential rates would remove this burden
by making the nondiscrimination rules unnecessary.
Other burdens on small firms are inherent in the use of employer plans and cannot be eliminated through use of differential
rates. Reporting and disclosure requirements, for example, impose
a burden of compliance that falls more heavily on smaller firms.
These burdens are, to some extent, addressed by the special provisions for simplified employee pensions, or SEPs. 96 Recent proposals have attempted to further lighten the administrative burden on
small businesses. 9 7 But although SEP rules eliminate the administrative burden of the nondiscrimination scheme, they do nothing to
address the basic defect of the upside-down tax subsidy. Since essentially all employees must be covered, firms with a high proportion of non-highly compensated workers receive lower subsidies
than those with a more highly paid work force.
IV
CAPITAL GAINS RATES

The tax code has long imposed a single nominal tax rate on
income. From 1922 until 1986, the Code contained one important
exception to this principle: long-term gain on capital assets, capital
95
I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(5)(C); 401(l). Social Security taxes provide marginal rates that
are uniform up to a ceiling, then drop to zero. Social Security benefits more or less track
marginal rates, and the idea behind integration is that pensions and Social Security
should increase proportionally, so that higher income people should have more
pensions.

96 SEPs permit employers to make an IRA contribution in the name of each employee, subject not to the IRA limits but to the more generous qualified plan limits.
These SEP contributions must not discriminate, must generally be uniform, and must be
made on behalf of each employee over age 21 who has worked three to five years and
has received at least $300 in compensation. Employers may exclude those who are ineligible for a qualified plan. I.R.C. § 408(k).
97 In introducing one such proposal, Representative La Falce said:
[A] growing number of U.S. workers do not have access to pensions....
Much of the problem, in my view, is caused by the incredibly complex
reporting requirements under existing pension laws. Meeting these requirements is hard enough for any employer, but it becomes prohibitively
burdensome and expensive for small businesses.
137 Cong. Rec. E1695 (daily ed. May 9, 1991). Other proposals to lighten the burden
on small businesses have recently been made. S. 318, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see
also S.2901 101st Cong. ist Sess. (1990). The Bush administration intended to introduce its own such legislation. Ellis Rosenthal, Administration's Pension Proposal Seen as
Somewhat "PO WER-less' ;JCT Rates Super-IRA as Big Drain, 51 TAX NoTEs 549 (1991); Bush
Unveils Proposalto Expand, Simplify Nation's Pension System, BNA PENS. & BEN. DAILY, May 1,
1991, at 17; see also Ellis Rosanthal, Pension Simplification: Similar Messages, Different Approaches,, 52 TAX NoTEs 7 (1991) (outlining congressional proposals to simplify pension
rules).
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gain, was taxed at a lower rate than other, ordinary income. Many
legislators and policy analysts have proposed reinstating preferential capital gains rates to stimulate savings. 98 Capital gains rates,
however, were not designed to encourage savings. They are, in fact,
a poor tool for encouraging savings. Moreover, general capital cuts
can be specifically designed to increase savings and are vastly superior to capital gains rates as an instrument of savings policy.
The special treatment of capital gains never provided a general
tax cut for capital, since the current income from capital investments
was not accorded capital gains treatment. For example, interest on
a bank account is, from an economic perspective, the return to capital, but such interest was taxed at ordinary rates. Capital gains treatment was granted only for capital income that occurred in the form
of appreciation. 99 For example, a parcel of land might increase in
value independent of any current rental services. This appreciation
remains unrealized until a cash flow is produced. At the time of
realization, typically through a sale, preferential capital gains rates
would have applied only to these deferred gains.
The capital gains preference has one potential advantage over
deduction-based subsidies: It can be designed as a set of progressive rates. But the capital gains preference has distributive drawbacks of its own. The regressive incidence of capital cuts stems in
part from the higher saving rate of the rich. The rich and poor differ not only in the rate at which they save but in the assets in which
they invest. Small savers are far more likely than large investors to
put their money in income-producing assets such as savings accounts. 10 0 Therefore, a capital subsidy limited to capital gains may
be more regressive than a general capital subsidy.
98
A small sample of such proposals includes H.R. 369, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 960, 1020 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1194, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(small business stock); H.R. 1721, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2703, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2873, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2958, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. 3128, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3514, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 3652, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3859, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 3875, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3925, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 3970, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
99 See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 17.01 (5th ed.,
1988).
100 Defenders of capital gains often point out that most taxpayers who realize capital
gains are middle class. Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield, The Casefor the Restoration of the Capital Gains Differential, 43 TAX NOTES, 1019-23 (1989). Opponents counter
that distribution by dollar value is heavily skewed to wealthier taxpayers. Gerald E. Auten &JosephJ. Cordes, Cutting Capital Gains Taxes, J. ECON PERSP. Winter 1991, at 181,
186-89. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that under the Bush adminsistration's most recent proposal to cut capital gains, 957 of the benefits would go to
families in the top quintile of income. COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., TAX PROGRESsIv=rY AND INCOME DISTRBurION 55 (Comm. Print 1974).
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Preferential capital gains treatment may be an inefficient capital
subsidy, as well as an unfair one. Capital gains rates were not initially justified as a means of subsidizing capital. Instead, it was intended to relieve some problems associated with the nontaxation of
unrealized gains. One such problem arises from a progressive rate
structure: The sudden recognition of many years' accumulated gain
may push a taxpayer into a tax bracket higher than would have applied during any year in which the appreciation occurred. This is
referred to as the problem of "bunching."' 0'1 A second problem occurs during inflationary periods when the apparent gain on many
assets is largely nominal. A third problem caused by the realization
requirement involves an inefficiency rather than an inequity: by deferring the tax on any given year's appreciation, the exemption of
unrealized gains reduces the overall tax rates on capital. The fact
that deferring gain reduces total tax liability may cause a taxpayer to
retain assets longer than efficiency dictates. This is called the lockin effect.
The problems of bunching and lock-in were for many years the
most commonly mentioned reasons for granting preferential treatment to capital gains. Both problems would be solved by an accretion tax that taxed gain as it occurred.' 0 2 The equivalent of an
accretion tax could be attained by calculating the tax due in the year
of sale so as to reflect the time value of money.' 0 3 Such a system of
cumulative tax reporting could easily be indexed to inflation, thus
solving the third problem addressed by capital gains rates.
Neither accretion taxation nor cumulative reporting, though,
has ever been seriously considered. Instead, the capital gains rules
provided a 60% deduction for the gains on capital assets held for
longer than six months. Capital gains treatment clearly reduced the
lock-in effect and relieved the effects of inflation and bunching, but
it addressed all three problems in a far from systematic way. A taxpayer received capital gains treatment even if he consumed rather
than reinvested the income he realized, and so presented a weakened case for relief from lock-in. Similarly, a taxpayer received the
benefits of capital gains rates even if he had been in the top marginal rates in all applicable years, and thus needed no relief from
bunching. Moreover, the inequities of bunching were compensated
for-sometimes in part, sometimes in whole, and sometimes more
101

See generallyJames W. Wetzler, CapitalGains and Losses, in COMPREHENSIVE
115, 130-32 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977).

INCOME

TAXATION

102
See, e.g., id. at 120-22; MARTIN DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL
GAINS TAXATION 183-91 (1968). Another solution to bunching is proration of capital

gains rates. Id. at 183-91.
103 See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 102, at 183-91; WILLIAM VIcKREY, AGENDA FoR A PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 172-95 (1947); Wetzler, supra note 101, at 120-22, 137-40.
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than in whole-by the advantages of deferral. 10 4 Likewise, the size
of any paper gains created by inflation depend on the magnitude of
the inflation and the length of the holding period, neither of which
were taken into account by the capital gains rate. Again, these gains
might be offset by the value of deferral, depending on the relative
magnitude of the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and the tax
rate.
Capital gains rates, then, serve imperfectly their intended
objectives of relieving bunching, lock-in, and the effects of inflation.
Not surprisingly, capital gains rates are no better at advancing the
05
goal for which they are now proposed, increasing investment.'
The key defect of capital gains as a savings subsidy is that capital
gains rates, by their nature, are targeted towards investments that
produce long-term appreciation rather than current income. Yet investments that produce current interest income, like savings accounts, contribute just as much to national savings as those that
produce long-term appreciation, like real estate. Since savings accounts seem at least as socially valuable as real estate, no rational
savings policy should be restricted to the rather oddly defined class
10 6
of assets that produce unrealized appreciation.
Proponents of capital gains rates might defend them as a reward not merely for savings, but for certain kinds of savings such as
venture capital investments. Yet a capital gains rate seems a poor
method of encouraging risk taking. The capital gains preference applies to investments that are not risky, and fails to alleviate the primary tax burden on risk-taking, limits on the deductibility of
0 7
losses.1
Capital gains proponents also argue that savings policies should
focus on long-term savings. This argument takes two different
forms. One version maintains that those who withdraw their savings
to use as consumption deserve no special break. But that argument
simply supports a consumption tax, rather than special treatment
for capital gains. A preference for capital gains is, at once, too narrow and too broad to achieve the goal of encouraging savings that
are long-term in this sense. An individual who reinvests the interest
on his savings account should, based on consumption tax principles,
not be taxed, yet he would not receive the benefits of capital gains
treatment. Conversely, an individual who liquidates a long-term
holding to finance current consumption would receive preferential
104

105
106
107

Wetzler, supra note 101, at 130-32.
Walker & Bloomfield, supra note 100, at 1019, 1020-22.
Auten & Cordes, supra note 100, at 189-90.
Id- at 190-91; Wetzler, supra note 101, at 147-49.

250

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:206

capital gains treatment, although according to consumption tax
principles, he should be fully taxed.
A second version of the argument that tax relief should be
targeted towards long-term investments is based on the claim that
American investors, especially when compared with their European
and Japanese counterparts, have an overly short time horizon. This
argument suggests that American investors place too much weight
on quarterly reports and are too willing to move on to a new investment at the first sign of trouble. But this restlessness, in fact, has
little to do with capital formation-a society with a high savings rate
might still contain restless investors. The twin problems of low savings and restlessness are not necessarily amenable to a single solution. Most households can be expected to save, but only a small
fraction of investors can be expected to take a long-term interest in
the companies whose shares they own. 0 8 A policy to encourage
long-term active investment will almost inevitably fail to reach the
many passive investors who merely contribute capital. Tax policy is
well-suited to broad based objectives like stimulating capital investment, but less suited to more specific objectives. If transient investment is indeed a problem, corporate law policy would provide a
more finely tailored solution than tax policy. For example, companies might be encouraged to adopt, as some already have, voting
rules that depend on the period for which an investor has held his
shares.
Capital gains cuts, then, are effective neither in correcting the
realization requirement nor in encouraging capital formation. An
ideal system of capital taxes would solve both problems by combining differentiated rates with an accretion tax, although accretion taxation may be infeasible, leaving unresolved the problems associated
with a realization requirement. Capital gains rates, however, are a
poor antidote to the realization requirement, and a system of differentiated taxes without capital gains provisions would be a second
best approach. Under this system, assets like bank accounts would
still be taxed more heavily than land, since the tax on gain would not
be deferred. Still, they would receive some tax relief through lower
general rates on capital which they would not receive under a capital
gains cut.
The argument for a capital gains cut, then, is quite weak. Indeed, the defense of capital gains cuts has an ad hoc quality. Capital
108 Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in CorporateInvestment, 38 UCLA
L. REv. 277, 306-13 (1990) (arguing that U.S. corporations and investors engage in
short term capital investor behavior because they are risk averse and they are pressured
by their financial advisors to participate in such short term investments as takeovers,
leveraged buyouts, and high level debt financing).
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gains proponents conspicuously do not defend these cuts against
the alternative of general capital cuts, but only against the alternative of uniform rates. The focus on capital gains cuts as a savings
incentive, therefore, seems to rest only on historical grounds. The
presumption of uniform rates is so strong that the weight of precedent seems necessary to overcome it. In this case, however, precedent is a poor guide to policy, and advocates of broad-based savings
cuts would do well to give up the crutch of past practice and attack
the presumption of uniformity directly by advocating more general
cuts in capital gains tax rates. 0 9
CONCLUSION

Concern about the low American savings rates has become almost universal in American public life. Our present system of savings incentives is an ad hoc mix of employer pensions and IRAs.
Both pensions and IRAs are seriously flawed in their design. Both
fail to reconcile the two central objectives of savings policy: stimulating growth through investment while not undermining the basic
progressivity of the tax system.
But while new proposals to stimulate savings are routinely offered, they are just as routinely defeated. The lack of an agreed on
policy to meet this common goal seems puzzling. On closer inspection, however, the lack of consensus results from a failure of imagination in policy design. Those who want sweeping cuts are
committed to supporting capital gains rates, an inefficient tool with
serious distributional disadvantages. Those who are concerned with
distributive equity advocate restricted deductions, which are even
clumsier devices than capital gains cuts.
The need to stimulate savings in a distributionally fair way can
be met by abandoning the venerable presumption that income tax
should be imposed at a single uniform rate. A separate schedule of
rates for capital and labor income could provide incentives to save
without sacrificing progressivity.

109 A few bills have proposed reducing taxes on at least some interest income. H.R.
1733, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (certain common investment funds); H.R. 2706,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (partial exclusion of dividends and interest received by
individuals): H.R. 3925, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

